

"We Don't Want Another Polisario": Tetouan and the Northern Question beyond the Rif

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Abstract

In 2011, during the 20 February Movement protests in Tetouan, the former capital of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco, the "dimension" of the North emerged once again as a specificity of the movement in the city. The so-called "northern question", in fact, is one of the most important legacies of the double Franco-Spanish colonial rule in Morocco: the economic, political, and social marginalization of the former Spanish Morocco, and its nationalist elite, in independent Morocco. Despite the centrality, during the colonial period, of Tetouan and its nationalist elite, bound to the Spanish colonial power by an intermediary relationship that had no parallel in the French Protectorate, Morocco's accession to independence dramatically revealed the existence of two administratively and politically separate and autonomous states. The Spanish zone of influence, or Spanish Protectorate in Morocco, was characterized by several specificities linked to the different colonial rule, first and foremost the fact that the European vernacular language was, and still is, Spanish and not French. However, these specificities were soon flattened to the French model, precisely because the reconfiguration of power within Morocco made the French-speaking nationalist elite emerge as dominant in the post-independence political field. The question of the north, therefore, cannot be referred only and exclusively to the Rif region. Precisely the analysis of the post-colonial era in Tetouan, and of the political and social trajectories of its nationalist elite, reveals a dynamic of political marginalization similar to that experienced by the Rif but which is declined in different demands and political projects, which also involve the ancient Tetouani nationalist elite.

Keywords: Moroccan nationalism; Spanish colonialism; independence; regionalism

Introduction

On 20 February 2011, Morocco saw its squares and streets filled with women and men who demanded a broad spectrum of economic, social and political reforms, which fit into the broader protest movement that spanned North Africa and the Middle East. Despite the reforms promoted by King Mohammed VI in the aftermath of the emergence of the 20 February Movement (M20F), including the promulgation of a new constitution that was supposed to limit, at least in theory, royal prerogatives (Maghraoui 2011), protests did not abate, as evidenced, for example, by the explosion of the Hirak movement in 2016 in the Rif (Wolf 2019; Rhani, Nabalssi and Benalioua 2020). The permanence and pervasiveness of social mobilizations should be read beyond the single episodes that characterized 2011: the historicity of protests, in fact, goes back to the colonial period and then continues into the post-colonial era against the institutional and political order that resulted from independence, constituting what Feliu Martínez, Mateo Dieste and Izquierdo Brichs (2019) define as "a century of social mobilization in Morocco"¹. This article, together with the others in this issue, aims to promote a critical reflection on the causes that explain the events of 2011 and their evolution over the following ten years. Scholars are increasingly seeking to deconstruct a stereotypical and (neo)orientalist reading of what are often simplistically referred to as the "Arab Springs" (Pace and Cavatorta 2012; Chalcraft 2015; 2016; Bayat 2017; Aboubakar et al. 2021). According to Chalcraft, it is important to study North Africa and the Middle East "not as a case in a petri dish but as an unfolding historical drama laden with stakes"². Morocco's 2011 has also been the subject of much international research and publications; however, according to Graiouid (2021: 1221), scholars primarily focused on "why Morocco has been able to eschew violence", unlike other regional contexts, "and manage a peaceful negotiation of the wave of protests led by the February 20th Movement". Academic analyses have mainly focused on the role of the monarchy and its ability to balance the interest of the state with that of society (Maghraoui 2011; Molina 2011; Abdel-Samad 2014; Badran 2020). Alongside this line of interpretation, other analytical perspectives have developed, highlighting the role of other actors in the socio-institutional transformations that have occurred in Morocco since 2011. Among them, from women (Salime 2012; Mijares and Ramírez Fernández 2021) to intellectuals (Graiouid and Belghazi 2013; Graiouid 2021), the analyses dedicated to the Rif region stand out. By adopting a historical perspective or discussing the importance of adopting it,³ scholars (El Maarouf and Belghazi 2018; Aziza 2019; Wolf 2019; Rhani, Nabalssi and Benalioua 2020) have investigated the causes of protests in the Rif region, which although closely related to the national, regional and international context, have some local specificities. These include the region's "longstanding marginalization from the rest of the country" (Wolf 2019: 1) or the fact that "it is the absence of the state that is deplored" in Riffian protests (Rhani, Nabalssi and Benalioua 2020: 8). According to Gillson Miller, "what really sets them [the Riffians] apart more than any other factor

is their historical memory", which takes the shape of a "strong sense of having been violently oppressed by the central government", whether it was the Franco-Spanish colonial power in 1920s or the independent Moroccan state in the 1950s.⁴ A *northern dimension* has also been detected in relation to the 2011 protests in Tetouan, the former capital of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco. The city, situated in the northern part of the country on the slopes of the Jbel Dersa, a few kilometers from the Mediterranean Sea and the Spanish city of Ceuta, was the scene of a huge protest movement that "originated directly in the city" (Feliu Martínez 2019: 429). This clarification, together with others that "underline the autonomy and specificity of the local area" (Feliu Martínez 2019: 435), has a longer-term history that has given shape to a "*dimensión norteña*" (literally northern dimension) (Feliu Martínez 2019: 444) of the protests. Some authors point out that this "northern dimension" is a heritage of the double Franco-Spanish Protectorate in Morocco (Mateo Dieste 2003; Velasco de Castro 2012c; 2019; Feliu Martínez 2019). However, the subject has never been explored by scholars. Accordingly, this article aims to investigate the post-colonial period in Tetouan, and the political and social trajectories of its nationalist elite, with the idea of bringing out the historical roots of the *northern question* beyond the Rif. The Tetouan nationalist notables were pioneers in the formation process of the Moroccan national movement. However, international and internal developments in the two zones of the Protectorate meant that the interests of the different parts involved in the independence game stopped converging once political emancipation was achieved.

In 1913 Tetouan became the capital of the Spanish zone of influence in Morocco. The Treaty of Fez, ratified between Moulay Abd al-Hafid (r. 1908-1912) and the French Plenipotentiary Minister in Tangier Eugène Regnault on 30 March 1912, imposed the Protectorate on the Alawite Makhzen⁵. With the Franco-Spanish agreement of November 1912, Spain obtained the recognition of what it considered its "historical rights" over Morocco and it was entrusted with the administration of a zone of influence in the north of the country (Northern Zone). In various ways, Spain already controlled some territories in the northern and southern shores of the region: Ceuta and Melilla, the Canary Islands, Ifni, the provinces of Saguía el Hamra and Río de Oro (later the Spanish Sahara) and Cabo Juby (Tarfaya). The 1912 agreement provided for the existence of only one protectorate, the French one, leaving Spain in a position of "*subarriendo*" (literally sublease) (De Madariaga 2019: 89-145). However, in practice, two administratively and politically autonomous states were established, and they functioned in this way until the independence of Morocco in 1956. The division of the territory between France and Spain resulted in the *splitting* (without considering the international regime to which the city of Tangier and its hinterland were subjected) of the Makhzen, with the appointment of a representative of the Sultan in Tetouan, the Caliph, who was subject to the protection of a Spanish colonial administration that was headed by the Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco. According to Mateo

Dieste and Villanova (2017: 245), "the Spanish authorities 'reinvented' a sultanate for the Spanish zone, in its ritual and symbolic practices, to rival with France, despite the official Spanish rhetoric explicitly recognizing the Sultan's authority".⁶ The duplicity of colonial rule resulted in a dual nationalist movement which, despite constant attempts to coordinate itself, wove different relations with the respective colonial powers, which led to the formulation of different strategies for the development of the national struggle. In Tetouan some families of notables, including the Bennouna and the Torres, proposed themselves as intermediaries of Spanish colonial power. These families were already included in the administrative and political network of the Makhzen, having provided the Sultans with ministers, governors, and other high-ranking charges in the central and regional administration between the 19th and 20th centuries (Miège, Benaboud and Erzini 1996: 79; Wolf 1999: 70, 103, 149). They were able to establish a relationship of intermediation with the colonial administration that allowed them to experience trajectories of socio-economic and political continuity within the Tetouan society, also thanks to their participation in the caliphal administration. Moreover, by exploiting the spaces of autonomy that had opened in the interstices of the relationship with the Spanish, the notables managed to organize and constitute a reformist movement that marked the furrow in which, from the 1930s onwards, the nationalist movement took shape. Finally, in 1936 the movement evolved into the first political organization officially recognized by the colonial authorities throughout Morocco: the Party of National Reform (PNR). Moroccan independence in 1956 was the detonator of the uprisings that gradually erupted from 1958–9 with protests in the Rif region. The case of the Rif (Aziza 2013; 2019), in fact, is emblematic of the process of marginalization of the former Spanish Northern Zone at the national level after the territorial, administrative, and political union between the two zones of the former protectorate. Situated in the north-east of Morocco between the city of Al-Hoceima and the Algerian border, the Rif in the 1920s was the scene of one of the bloodiest colonial wars, in which the Spanish army used chemical weapons for the first time in history to put an end to armed resistance and the Republic (1921–1926) led by Abd el-Krim al-Khattabi. Moreover, during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), the Rif was the Franco army's favorite recruitment area, due to the socio-economic crisis of the time. Furthermore, decolonization exposed the problems associated with the existence of two different colonial states, which produced administrative and political elites with different and sometimes conflicting interests. In other words, the Tetouan nationalist notables, like the former Northern Zone, were politically marginalized following the merger with the Istiqlal⁷ in March 1956. The frustrated attempt in 1996, around which this article revolves, to re-found a party (Party of Reform and Unity, PRU) that recalled the PNR, demonstrates the permanence of a hard core of the nationalist elite that has not adapted to the reconfigurations of power that territorial unity brought with it. Despite the huge investments that King Mohammed VI directed to the north of the

country, especially in Tangier (Vatin 2016), the "northern dimension" perceived in the 2011 mobilizations is a symptom of the economic, political, and social marginalization of the former Spanish Morocco, and its nationalist elite, constituting one of the most important legacies of the double Franco-Spanish colonial rule.

Why does Interior Minister Driss Basri (1979-1999) speak of "another Polisario"⁸ in referring to the PRU? Why, 40 years after Moroccan independence, is Tetouan still referred to as a city in the "Northern Zone", a term used to define the Spanish zone of influence in northern Morocco within the French Protectorate? Why did the PRU, which was never set up, have a *norteña* connotation, not to say a properly *tetuan*⁹ connotation? To answer these questions, the article uses Spanish archival sources, especially the bulletins of the Spanish Consulate in Tetouan in the early post-independence period, and Moroccan journalistic sources, particularly the monthly magazine *Al-Hayat*. Moreover, the article's strong point is the use of oral sources, already published or collected by the author during periods of fieldwork in Tetouan. Oral sources are fundamental for recomposing the mosaic of the post-colonial period in Tetouan, which was a victim, like the former Northern Zone, not only of political but also of historiographical marginalization. The central role played by the Tetouan nationalist elite in the colonial period, in fact, was progressively relegated to the confused memory of its main personalities, while the silence surrounding the decolonization of the former Northern Zone is deafening, which is why we still talk of a "conspiracy of silence" (Velasco de Castro 2017: 32).

A "Life" for the North: Regionalization as a Colonial Legacy in the Pages of *Al-Hayat*

A few months after the adoption of a new constitution of which the regionalization project was one of the main axes (Ojeda García 2002), a meeting was organized in Tetouan on 16 November 1996 with the aim of setting up a new political party: the PRU (Morales Lezcano 2002: 273; Velasco de Castro 2017: 30). The name recalled those of the nationalist parties founded in Tetouan in the 1930s, the first to be officially recognized by the colonial authorities throughout the protectorate: the PNR, founded in 1936 and chaired by Abd al-Khaliq Torres (1910-1970), and the Party of Moroccan Unity (PUM), founded in 1937 and chaired by Mohamed el-Mekki Naciri (1906-1994). The promoters, as well as future secretary and executive committee member, were Abou Bakr Bennouna and Mohammed Ibn Azzuz Hakim (1924-2014). The former is a member of one of the historical families who led the national movement in Tetouan and the latter was a supporter of the PNR and right-hand man of Torres in the 1950s. In addition, Mehdi Bennouna (1918-2010), Abou Bakr's elder brother and spokesman for Moroccan nationalism at the United Nation (UN) in the late 1940s and early 1950s, should have been its president.¹⁰ Abou Bakr Bennouna was born in 1928, the year in which his father, Abd al-Salam, defined for the first time by Rêzette (1955: 83)

as "father of Moroccan nationalism", founded the Cooperativa Industrial Hispano-Marroquí, one of the several economic and cultural activities through which Abou Bakr's father was implicated in society's revival in the 1920s. Abd al-Salam Bennouna died in December 1935, a year before the constitution of the PNR in Tetouan, of which his son Tayeb was appointed secretary, a position he held until 1956. Also, Abou Bakr's mother, Emqueltum Aragona, was an important nationalist figure: not only was she responsible for financial management of some nationalist activities¹¹ but she was also one of the organizers of the women's section of the PNR.¹² Like his other brothers, Mehdi, Driss and Abd al-Krim, Abou Bakr began his political activity in the PNR in his early twenties.¹³ Granted scholarships from the Spanish colonial administration, Abou Bakr also studied in Madrid and Seville between 1947 and 1955.¹⁴ After Moroccan independence he was appointed Head of the Cabinet of the Tetouan's Governor, then President of Radiodiffusion-Télévision Marocaine, and finally Ambassador in Yemen and Consul in the Canary Islands.¹⁵ The life and political story of Mohammed Ibn Azzuz Hakim was collected in the first chapter of the book *El Protectorado español en Marruecos en primera persona: Muhammad Ibn Azzuz Hakim*, written by Velasco de Castro (2017: 21-4). The uniqueness, as the author defines it, of Ibn Azzuz's life trajectory lies in the fact that he was the first Moroccan official to be incorporated into the Spanish colonial administration after winning the open competition for officials in Madrid (Velasco de Castro 2017: 58). Close to the PNR but never officially affiliated, Ibn Azzuz became Chief Advisor of the Oficina de Enlace (Liaison Office) of the Ministerio de Acción Social (Ministry of Social Action) of the Makhzen's caliphal government which Abd al-Khaliq Torres headed. After the independence of Morocco in 1956, he was appointed Secretary of the Moroccan delegation charged with the transfer of the powers of Northern Morocco and General Secretary of the Ministry charged with the northern administration which Torres headed (Velasco de Castro 2012c: 27). According to Ibn Azzuz himself, interviewed by Morales Lezcano (2002: 272) in 2001, "together with some people who think the same thing", considering that none of the existing parties in Morocco "satisfy [our] anxieties in the political field", "we have decided to create our own party".¹⁶ However, "in Rabat they did not even want to receive the note in which we asked for authorization to celebrate the constitutive meeting" (*ibid.*).¹⁷ They were then forced to organize a celebration in memory of Abd al-Salam Bennouna, "Moroccan *norteño* (literally, northern) or *nordista* (literally, northerner)"¹⁸ (*ibid.*), which was to take place in the Bennouna house in Tetouan. Not only did the authorization never arrive, neither from Rabat nor from Tetouan, but on the appointed day (unspecified, but probably not long after 16 November 1996) Ibn Azzuz was physically prevented from accessing the Bennouna house by the "public force", which had received an order from the Governor of the city to guard its streets and gates, from which it was neither possible to enter nor to leave (*ibid.*). Despite the presence of "7300 people who committed themselves to supporting the PRU", the celebration

did not take place (*ibid.*: 273)¹⁹. Abou Bakr Bennouna adds an important detail to the story, namely that Driss Basri, Minister of the interior, replied to the promoters of the initiative that the authorization had not been granted because "we do not want another Polisario in northern Morocco".²⁰ The Polisario Front is the political organization that has been carrying on, since 1973, the armed liberation struggle in Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony, abandoned by the former motherland in 1975 and annexed to Moroccan territory within the more general framework of "Greater Morocco" (Correale and Gimeno Martín 2015; Joffé 2010). As Hernando de Larramendi (2010) points out, "Rabat interpreted Spain's withdrawal from Western Sahara as a restitution of Western Sahara to Morocco by virtue of its historical rights over the territory" but Morocco was, and still is, not disposed to negotiate the independence. For this reason, King Hassan II had to imagine an alternative to independence, and he found it in the "regionalization" but in "the framework of a unitary and sovereign state" (*ibid.*).²¹ According to Bennouna, the government of Rabat thought that the PRU "was a separatist party but it was not, it just had to give a voice to the north"²² and was made up of "educated people who cared about its particular part, namely the Northern Zone".²³ The last attempt to constitute the PRU was made on 13 January 2000, in Casablanca, a few months after the establishment of the new King Mohammed VI. Ibn Azzuz argues that the choice of the Atlantic city was a way to "deceive" the Rabat authorities: explaining "to officials that the party headquarters would be Casablanca", the promoters believed it would be easier to get permission (Morales Lezcano 2002: 274). On the other hand, Bennouna argues instead that the celebration of the founding act in Casablanca, where "many persons from Tetouan were with us, supporting the political project", had as its aim "to demonstrate to the authorities that the party was national, not regional as claimed by the Minister of the Interior".²⁴ In Casablanca the statutes, the hymn and the insignia were approved. However, "when we presented the documentation for the legalization of the party, the bureaucrats refused to give us the receipt" that the dossier had been delivered.²⁵ Ultimately, on the threshold of the new millennium, the Tetouan nationalist elite tried to play at the center, at the national level, to try, once again, to count at least on a regional if not merely urban level.

Some of the answers to the introductory questions can be found in the pages of the monthly *Al-Hayat (La vida)*. *Periódico mensual independiente al servicio de los intereses del Norte y de la cooperación hispano-marroquí* (The Life. Independent Monthly Magazine Serving the Interests of the North and Hispano-Moroccan Cooperation), whose first issue, number 78, was published in Tetouan on 1 March 1994. Abou Bakr Bennouna appeared as editor while Ibn Azzuz Hakim as editor-in-chief (Velasco de Castro 2017: 30). The fact that the first number is 78 is not accidental, nor is the date of publication. The publication of the magazine, in fact, was resumed exactly where it had left off with number 77 in 1936, while the publication date coincided with that of the first issue of the magazine dating back to 1934 (*ibid.*). The aims underlying the two

editions of *Al-Hayat* and the content of the articles that filled the pages in the 1930s and 1990s indicate the main differences between the two editions. The publication of *Al-Hayat* in 1934 was a conquest for the nationalists in the intermediation process with Spanish colonialism precisely because the colonizers were forced to satisfy some of their demands, including freedom of the press, presented to the colonial administration and Spanish government in three different reform plans between 1931 and 1934 (Benjelloun 2013). Considering that in the French Protectorate the first nationalist magazine in Arabic was published only in 1937, *Al-Hayat* was an achievement, more generally, for Moroccan nationalism: it not only "mocked French censorship because it was published in the Spanish Zone"²⁶ (Aixelá-Cabré 2017: 157) but also directed its propaganda mainly against France. However, *Al-Hayat* stopped publishing due to a series of fines imposed on the editorial staff for some content considered anti-Spanish propaganda. *Al-Hayat* published in the 1990s, on the other hand, was a bilingual, Arabic-Spanish magazine; although there were more pages in Arabic and the articles published were different in the two languages, the topics covered were almost always the same. Furthermore, if in the 1930s Spain was targeted by the columnists of *Al-Hayat* as a colonial power, in the 1990s it became the bank for reclaiming the ambitions of the former Northern Zone to count on a national level. Despite the marginalization in the Moroccan Protectorate of Spanish colonialism compared to that of France, the existence of two different colonial states, which implemented different and sometimes conflicting colonial policies, contributed to the formation of a Spanish-speaking elite that demanded a more central role, if not at the national level, then at least at the regional or urban ones. As Velasco de Castro (2017: 31) writes, "the aims (of the magazine) are defined in the subtitle", to serve the interests of the North and Hispano-Moroccan cooperation. Which north we are talking about is clarified by Ibn Azzuz in the editorial of the Spanish version of the magazine: the "north of Morocco which, by virtue of the Franco-Spanish agreement of 27 November 1912, was officially separated from the rest of the Kingdom, to be subjected to the Spanish Protectorate, whose characteristics were different from the French Protectorate regime, to which the rest of Morocco was subject"²⁷ Ibn Azzuz continues writing that "the northern Morocco today presents the characteristics of the poor brother compared to the rich one, which is the rest of the Kingdom"²⁸ On the first page in the Arabic version, the article entitled *Why Al-Hayat?* highlights the issue, arguing that independence has also brought negative results, including "the marginalization of the North, the disappearance of the PNR and the removal of Torres from the political scenario because he was appointed ambassador to Madrid and Cairo and the North was left without a leader"²⁹ According to Ibn Azzuz and the columnists of *Al-Hayat*, the "northern question" is the exclusion suffered from the former Spanish protectorate after the administrative and political union between the two former protectorates and the establishment of the institutions of independent Morocco³⁰. The perceived marginalization, however, is not only set out in economic and social terms,

but above all in political, linguistic, and cultural ones. In *Al-Hayat* it is written that "the years passed, and the North did not find a party to defend its interests, nor a leader, nor a magazine".³¹ In addition, the pages of the newspaper also discuss why, still in the 1990s, "we defend the persistence and spread of the Spanish language in Morocco".³² The theme of language is one of the most addressed in the pages of *Al-Hayat* since the Tetouan nationalist elite spoke Spanish as a second language. And it still speaks it today, considering, for example, that the language used for interviews with Abou Bakr Bennouna is Spanish. The topic of the language is mainly dealt with from a political point of view: why in 1956 was decided that the second language of administration and education, alongside Arabic, should be French, "sacrificing more than 200,000 Moroccan students who in other areas had Spanish as a second language and to whom French was imposed overnight"?³³ The use of Arabic as a national language is defended on the pages of *Al-Hayat*, lashing out against the *frenchization*. The need to recover the Spanish language is motivated, among other things, by "the innate propensity of northern Moroccans towards the Spanish language" and the desire "to preserve a language that for them was and is like a second naturalness".³⁴ For these reasons, the goals that *Al-Hayat* wanted to achieve were: "[c]laim the place that corresponds to the North in the Kingdom, within the regime of regionalization (not regionalism) advocated by the new constitution of the country, but with due respect for the national unity and territorial integrity of Morocco, with the aim that the North ceases to be, as it has been until now, a marginalized region, by virtue of the *dejadez* (literally neglect, translation by the author) and abandonment in which central governments have kept it since independence".³⁵

In the end, *Al-Hayat* should have been "the organ of expression of the firm will that animates us to work for a sincere, fraternal and perennial Hispano-Moroccan collaboration, in all fields of relations between two neighboring peoples and brothers, who have had for centuries a shared history, civilization and culture".³⁶

Al-Hayat of the 1930s was the instrument through which nationalists, including those from the French Protectorate (Aixelá-Cabré 2017: 158), voiced their frustrations mainly against France but also against Spain. *Al-Hayat* of the 1990s, on the other hand, while not denying "the national unity and territorial integrity of Morocco"³⁷ adopts a more particular perspective, which coincides with that of the former Spanish Morocco and especially Tetouan. In addition, the columnists claimed a special relationship with the former colonial power, which also included recovering the study of Spanish language in Morocco. However, between the two editions of the magazine also emerges an important trajectory of continuity: the management and editorial staff of the magazine were the expression of the same nationalist elite that had founded it in the 1930s. Prominent members of the newspaper's management had personal or family life stories close to or coinciding with the Tetouan nationalist experience. Even the political slant given to the newspaper (despite Ibn Azzuz himself having defined *Al-*

Hayat as "apolitical")³⁸ revealed a deep debt to the PNR and its former leadership. In the 1930s, Tetouan was "a hub that connected the 'interior' of the country, the French zone, to Europe and the Middle East" and beyond (Stenner 2016: 431) and the Tetouan nationalist elite was at the centre of this network. In the 1990s, however, the city was on the fringes of the country's political life, with a significant rate of electoral abstention (López García 2000). The last members of the old nationalist guard, such as Ibn Azzuz and Bennouna, did not express anti-national positions but they supported the hypothesis of *regionalization*, always pointing out, however, how it was different from *regionalism*. Ibn Azzuz himself suggested to Hassan II that he had to "consider the Spanish model as the most appropriate to regionalize Morocco, with an autonomous government and a regional parliament"³⁹ (Morales Lezcano 2002: 271). The region has been the subject of political debate since independence even if, "in practice, it only served as a key word in political discourse which, by only mentioning it, seemed to solve all the ills of the country"⁴⁰ (Ojeda García 2002: 142). Regions, that appeared in 1971 as "economic regions", "had a weak legislative initiative and limited powers" (Ojeda García, Suarez Collado 2015: 50). The 1992 Constitution and its revision in 1996 recognized legal personality and financial autonomy for the 16 created regions, including that of Tangier-Tetouan. However, the "limited transfer of competencies and human and financial resources from the central state to the regions" and the need to "maintain a centralized state to control the political system and preserve the country's territorial integrity, cohesion and homogeneity"⁴¹ left regions with no political or economic power (*ibid.*). The total absence of "political will to carry out a true regionalization", namely the real administrative, economic and political autonomy and, so, to attribute self-governing prerogatives to the new regions, resulted in "a region empty of content and already born dead" (Ojeda-García 2002: 143). Furthermore, "the [Moroccan] state, highly centralized, would not allow the emergence of local counterpowers that it is unable to control and integrate into its institutional structures"⁴² (Ojeda García 2002: 142). The constitutional recognition of the region gives meaning to the words of Ibn Azzuz in the editorial of number 78 of *Al-Hayat* and the regional elections of 1997 likewise explain the attempt to establish the PRU a year earlier. Although Ibn Azzuz and Bennouna themselves clarify several times that it was not "regionalism", it can be assumed that the purpose was to govern their region with their own party and with very specific objectives, including to recover relations with the former colonial power. However, what explains the persistence of the ambitions of representation from a hard core of the Tetouan nationalist elite of the colonial era on the threshold of the new millennium? "In Morocco there is no law limiting the number of political parties" (Morales Lezcano 2002: 272) so why was the PRU not given permission to exist?

Two Morocco(s), One Independence: the *Tetuaní* Notables, the Istiqlal and the Monarchy Facing the Challenges of the New Nation-state

On 7 April 1956, negotiations on the independence of the Spanish zone of influence in Morocco were concluded in Madrid. Ibn Azzuz participated in the negotiations as interpreter of Mohammed V (Velasco De Castro 2012c: 34) in place of Abd al-Khaliq Torres, whose presence was requested by Rabat⁴³ but was not authorized on the advice of High Commissioner García Valiño (1951-1956) since Torres, as leader of the PNR, had been "instigator and inspirer of the subversive acts" that took place in Tetouan in March during the Franco-Moroccan negotiations in Paris.⁴⁴ According to Ibn Azzuz, Torres was in Tangier at the same time, where he was exiled in January 1956 because he "disagreed"⁴⁵ with the hypothesis of autonomy of the Northern Zone feared by García Valiño (Mateo Dieste and Villanova 2017: 239-240). Also, according to Ibn Azzuz, in March 1956 Mohammed V wanted Torres to receive him in Tetouan on his return from Madrid, a request that was accepted by the Spanish Foreign Minister. Notwithstanding the efforts of Ibn Azzuz to have independence declared "in Tetouan rather than in Rabat" (Morales Lezcano 2002: 251) in the end Tetouan became "the capital of the union".⁴⁶ Indeed, in Tetouan on 9 April 1956, Mohammed V "delivered a historical speech in which he announced to the Moroccan people the achievement of territorial unity",⁴⁷ that is to say "the union of the North with the South".⁴⁸ After 44 years of double Franco-Spanish colonial administration, the independent Kingdom of Morocco finally saw light. However, the "Greater Morocco", claimed by nationalist irredentism, enunciated, supported, and reformulated several times by Allal al-Fasi, leader of Istiqlal, and adopted in a selective form by the monarchy and the rest of the political forces in the post-independence period, was born "mutilated" (Hernando de Larramendi 2008: 308). Although the Additional Protocol, which governed future Hispano-Moroccan relations, wished "a happy cooperation of the two nations in the future" (Ybarra Enríquez de la Orden 1998: 263), the relationship between these did not take long to deteriorate due to the emergence of various territorial conflicts (Tarfaya, Ifni, Western Sahara, Ceuta, and Melilla). Furthermore, even if Madrid wished to have the same influence as Paris in Morocco, especially due to the support granted to Mohammed V during his exile (1953-1955), Rabat "was not willing to grant it the same privileges" (Ybarra Enríquez de la Orden 1998: 269), neither in the economic and commercial field, nor in the diplomatic and political ones. The transfer of powers, governed by the Additional Protocol, in the former Northern Zone was entrusted to a Moroccan delegation chaired by Torres. At the end of 1956, Spain had already transferred to Morocco "almost all the powers and services", although until 1961 some regiments of the Spanish army were kept on Moroccan territory "to defend the borders with the areas of Spanish sovereignty"⁴⁹ (Ybarra Enríquez de la Orden 2014: 359). Furthermore, in June 1956 Torres was appointed ambassador to Madrid and Ibn Azzuz followed the nationalist leader, holding the role of Culture and Press Attaché (Velasco de Castro

2012a: 27). After taking office in the embassy, Torres spoke words of attachment towards Spain, considering the "historical ties that translate into racial affinity, the identity of ideas and traditions" that bind "the two nations" and expressed gratitude to the Spanish state for "the historic gesture" of supporting the "legitimacy of the throne of our country" in the years of Mohammed V's exile.⁵⁰ Torres' words contain the deepest sense of Spanish colonial discourse: the proximity between Moroccans and Spaniards, by virtue of an alleged past of coexistence during the Muslim kingdoms of Al-Andalus between the eighth and sixteenth centuries, from which descended the concept of "*hermandad hispano-marroqui*" (Spanish Moroccan brotherhood) (Calderwood 2018; Mateo Dieste 2003; 2012). Although there were moments of confrontation and conflict, "the images built by Moroccans in the colonial period", whose legacies persisted in the post-colonial era, "depended a lot on the type of relationship that the various groups had with the Spaniards"⁵¹ (Mateo Dieste 2003: 452), as the words of Torres or those of Ibn Azzuz in *Al-Hayat* demonstrate. However, on 1 January 1957, Torres's appointments as Resident Minister and Ambassador to Spain were not renewed.⁵² The reasons for Torres' resignation are not specified. However, it was probably not Spain that forced his resignation since "the effects that prevented Mr. Torres to go with the Sultan to Madrid" in 1956 were considered by the Spaniards as "completely erased".⁵³ A document from the Spanish Consulate in Tetouan suggests that Mohammed V was "very happy with Torres's labor in the Northern Zone"⁵⁴ as Resident Minister. However, the former Spanish Morocco was "a small region" and therefore the King did not see "the need for a central power because the governors can coordinate directly with Rabat".⁵⁵ Throughout the month of January, informants from the Spanish Consulate gathered comments on Torres' resignation. The first point that emerges has to do precisely with the labor of Torres as Minister. Some documents suggest that, thanks to his role in the ministry, Torres shared "benefits and prebends among his friends in Tetouan".⁵⁶ Other documents refer to cars gifted "to some members of the PNR"⁵⁷ and amounts of money withdrawn from funds for Algeria "to make the necessary propaganda in the Northern Zone with the aim of strengthening his position" and obtaining an extension as Minister.⁵⁸ The second point that emerges from the documents concerns what the Spaniards, starting from the merger of the PNR with Istiqlal on 18 March 1956, defined as "ancient reformists", that is, the former leaders, militants and supporters of the PNR. Loyal to Abd al-Khaliq Torres, two days after the integration of the two parties some of these personalities complained that Torres "had sold himself to Istiqlal, playing the game of Allal al-Fasi".⁵⁹ Furthermore, since February 1957 the rumors that Torres would soon re-found the PNR became more insistent. On the day of the unification of the two parties in Tangier, Allal al-Fasi said that "the Moroccan nation does not need to increase political tendencies"⁶⁰ (Palazzoli 1974: 157). The four main Moroccan nationalist parties (PNR, PUM, Istiqlal and PDI) coordinated themselves in the National Bloc as early as 1951 but preserved "their internal freedom of action"⁶¹ (Rèzette 1955: 192). The

National Bloc manifesto rejected any "negotiations before independence" and "on matters of lesser importance under the colonial regime"⁶² (*ibid.*: 191). According to De Madariaga (2019: 509), by ratifying the manifesto "the PNR had shown an irreconcilable attitude towards any type of cooperation with colonialism, of any color and any flag"⁶³. However, on 29 December 1954, Torres accepted the charge of Ministro de Acción Social (Minister of Social Action) in the new government of the caliphal Makhzen,⁶⁴ whose constitution was part of the autonomist strategy of the Spanish colonial administration (*ibid.*: 515). Ibn Azzuz wrote that in January 1956 Torres was in Tangier because he was in "disagreement" with the autonomist policy of García Valiño, or the attempt to make the Northern Zone an independent entity from the rest of the protectorate (*ibid.*: 496-600). However, an article published in January 1955 in *Al-Umma*, the PNR's magazine since 1952, confirmed that the "Central Commission of the PNR had accepted the party's participation in the government as a practical step for the improvement of autonomy".⁶⁵ Ibn Azzuz (1955: 36) himself, in one of his articles argued the need to "declare the autonomy of the caliphate"⁶⁶. Again in 2001, interviewed by Morales Lezcano, Ibn Azzuz confirmed that he and "the Torres reformists" had "already thought about the idea of autonomy in the area"⁶⁷ (Morales Lezcano 2002: 255). Even if the issue of autonomy remains to be studied, the relevant fact is that the duplicity of domination and colonial policies is reflected not only in the double process of development of the national movement in the two zones but also in the adoption of different political practices and strategies by the different elites who participated in the struggle for independence.

The first years after 1956 were characterized by the emergence of the engagement between the monarchy and nationalist parties, between parties and within them. According to the "national novel", independence was the result of the "«Revolution of the king and the people»; «people» for which the Istiqlal party claimed the monopoly of representation"⁶⁸ (Bennani-Chraïbi 2021: 79). Despite the fact that Istiqlal attempted, and in some ways managed, to establish itself as a hegemonic party, it lost the challenge of the one-party system, an ambition announced at the party congress in December 1955 (Palazzoli 1974: 157), due to the consolidation of the monarchy as a dominant political actor. It is in this context that the Tetouan *northern question* emerges. The duplicity of the Franco-Spanish Protectorate resulted in a border which, although permeable, contributed to the "constitution of a territorial artifice, such as the 'Northern Zone', of great importance in the post-colonial era and still reproducing the different models of Spanish and French colonization, from the organization of infrastructures to linguistic acculturation or the education of the elites in their respective metropolises"⁶⁹ (Mateo Dieste 2003: 449). The reasons that led the "ancient reformists" to hope to split from Istiqlal emerge from the Spanish archive documents and are confirmed by some oral sources collected by the author in Tetouan. The first reason is the political marginalization suffered by the old leadership of the PNR at

the national level. In 1955, shortly before Mohammed V's return from exile, Torres asserts "the need of the North to be represented in the first independent Moroccan government"⁷⁰ (Morales Lezcano 2002: 251). Although the rumors collected in Tetouan claimed that Torres would have obtained the charge of Foreign Minister,⁷¹ his demand was not granted: the first independent Moroccan government, which was appointed on 26 October 1956, was "integrated only by Moroccan personalities coming from and residing in the Southern Zone".⁷² In June 1957 the Spaniards asked themselves: "[w]hy was the area that most loyally served the dynastic interests that triumphed with independence omitted [from the country's government]?"⁷³ In January 1957 Torres remarked that "regionalism does not blind me, but the Northern Zone is worth as much as the others and cannot tolerate the contempt" of which it is constantly a victim.⁷⁴ Likewise, marginalization is also perceived at the party level. Torres and Tayeb Bennouna not only took the Istiqlal card in March 1956, but also became, respectively, a member of the executive and Inspector General of the party in the north of the country.⁷⁵ Abou Bakr, Mehdi and Driss Bennouna, on the other hand, did not join the party: "[w]hen Tayeb swore to join Istiqlal", Bennouna recalls with a smile during the interview, "Allal al-Fasi said he had done it for all his brothers".⁷⁶ Ahmed Jdid, the son of a PRN affiliate and a student in the nationalist free schools in the 1950s, who was alienated from the internal power logic of the elite of Tetouan, states that "the people of the North did not admit" the merger between the PRN and the Istiqlal in March 1956 because "it was a delivery" and the PRN became "the shadow" of the Istiqlal.⁷⁷ "Most of the former leaders of the PNR", added Bennouna, "did not agree with Torres because not only did they no longer have within the Istiqlal an autonomous party with many members, but they did not even get the compensations they hoped for".⁷⁸ Asked by the author about what kind of compensations he was talking about, Bennouna cuts the conversation asserting that he had "already said too much".⁷⁹ Spanish documents, however, suggest that the "compensations" Bennouna refers to had to do precisely with political representation. Torres, in fact, "regretted the merger with Istiqlal because now he could rely on a strong party of which he would be the leader and he would not be excluded from the political matters of the country".⁸⁰ Indeed, on 31 July 1958, Torres presented an official request to the King "to reorganize his ancient party", but the petition was not accepted.⁸¹ According to Abou Bakr Bennouna, until his death in 1970 "Torres remained firmly convinced that he wanted to break up with Istiqlal".⁸² The marginalization perceived by the Tetouan elite also passed through the *frenchisation* of Moroccan public affairs, which was the result of the central role that France played in Morocco in the colonial and post-colonial eras, and the consequent exclusion of the Spanish-speaking elites of the former Northern Zone. "A dangerous difference has been created between the two Zones", the Spaniards write, "because those [in the Southern Zone] despise the Spanish speakers and these [in the Northern Zone] affirm they are totally French and traitors".⁸³ The problem of the *frenchisation* of Moroccan institutions was investigated by Mimoun Aziza (2019: 257-275) for the Rif region. Between October

1958 and February 1959, the Rif was the scene of a revolt which, among other socio-economic problems, protested about the marginalization of the Spanish-speaking elite "in favor of the French-speaking administrators who came from other regions of Morocco"⁸⁴ (*ibid.*: 259), generally "members of the Istiqlal party" (*ibid.*: 260). "Political representation" (Aziza 2013: 265) in central institutions was claimed as well as that the administration officials had to be "native of the Rif" (Aziza 2019: 272). By establishing the base of military operations in Tetouan, the Crowned Prince Moulay Hassan violently repressed the Rif revolt, finding "the support" of Istiqlal (*ibid.*: 268). The implication of some former leaders of the PNR, Torres for example, as members of Istiqlal, remains to be explored. However, Spanish documents suggest that, unlike the Rif, in Tetouan "the ancient reformists" who occupy charges "that Torres granted them at the beginning of independence are afraid of losing" their administrative and political charges because they "earn good wages"⁸⁵ and therefore "they follow Allal al-Fasi because it is the only way to preserve them".⁸⁶ The "northern question" continued to be an open wound, as demonstrated by the "northern" connotation of the revolts that progressively took place in the former Spanish Zone (Feliu Martínez, Mateo Dieste and Izquierdo Brichs 2019) and continues to be so today for those who have the memory and the awareness, in Tetouan as well as in al-Hoceima or Nador. According to Ahmed Jdid, for example, Torres "believed that the union with Istiqlal would be to the benefit of the North, but it was a gamble because after he surrendered, he was sent Ambassador to Spain, then to Cairo, and they took over everything".⁸⁷ For Bennouna or Ibn Azzuz, however, this wound does not bring with it the memory of hunger or of repression, in the police and military sense of the term, but rather that of a glorious past of the city and its elite that no longer exists in the present. Despite the marginalization within Istiqlal and at the national level, from a socio-economic point of view the former leaders of the PNR experienced trajectories of continuity, occupying important administrative, diplomatic and political positions, even if not those which they would ultimately have hoped to occupy. The Riffian people (Rhani, Nabalssi and Benalioua 2020) and the "common" Tetouan people (Bennani-Chraïbi 2021: 132) demanded greater consideration from central institutions and representation within them. On the other hand, the Tetouan elite aspired, still on the threshold of the new millennium, not so much, or not only, to the representation of the North in Rabat but above all to greater autonomy in governing the former Northern Zone, so that the hard core of the nationalist leadership of the colonial era could return to occupy a central role on the Moroccan political scene.

Conclusions

The analysis of the Moroccan post-colonial era clashed with the "lack of interest" (Aziza 2017: 387) of Moroccan historiography in the independence of the former Northern Zone, which Ibn Azzuz, who was Professor of History at the time of the Protectorate (Velasco de Castro 2012a: 34), defines as a "conspiracy of silence" (Velasco de Castro 2017: 28). European historiographies, except Spanish ones, disregard the

duplicity of colonialism and nationalism in Morocco, focusing above all on French colonialism and the French-speaking nationalist elites. On the other hand, Moroccan historiography does not recognize Spanish-speaking nationalism in general, and Tetouan nationalism in particular, despite the leading role played in the struggle for independence, as Velasco de Castro (2019) points out in her article on Moroccan historiography related to the nationalist movement. The "conspiracy of silence", therefore, is the (successful) attempt to marginalize, if not eliminate, the memory of Tetouan nationalism from national history. The history of the PNR is the prerogative of very distinguished authors, most of whom, like Ibn Azzuz himself, were or still are members of that same elite that official history decided to exclude from the "national novel". However, "memory produces images that most of the time are dominated by the sacralization of matters or people"⁸⁸ (Akmir 2017: 121); in other words, it is unlikely if not impossible to write "the story of themselves" pretending to be objective and exhaustive. In the pages of *Al-Hayat*, Ibn Azzuz often lashed out at the "conspirators", arguing that "the *norteños* [people who lived in Spanish Morocco] have always been monarchists" and "defended the unity of Morocco and its sovereignty".⁸⁹ Although it is not clear who these "conspirators" actually are, considering the claims of Ibn Azzuz in *Al-Hayat* it is likely that the "conspiracy of silence" has to do with the political and historiographical marginalization suffered by former PNR leaders in the post-colonial era. The historiographical problem arises from the fact that the "national novel" does not admit grey areas, conceiving contemporary Moroccan history in a dichotomous way: those who "resisted" and those who "collaborated with" colonialism. Tetouan notables, as well as intermediaries in other colonial contexts (Burbank and Cooper 2010; Lawrence, Osborn and Roberts 2006), blurred the dividing line between the colonizers and the colonized, creating key intersections of power and authority in which they strategically exploited their influence with the aim of strengthening their well-being, political power and status, according to an individual or collective logic (Lawrence, Osborn and Roberts 2006, 4). In other words, the "pragmatism" (Velasco de Castro 2012b) of the notables, net of the patriotic ideologizations underlying some analyses (Velasco de Castro 2012b; De Madariaga 2019), allowed them to cover, at the same time, institutional and political roles that were apparently irreconcilable. On the one hand, the participation of notables in the colonial administration ensured a certain continuity to their socio-political and economic positions within society. On the other hand, it allowed them to *become nationalists* and play a key role in the formation of the Moroccan national movement. Independence and the need to build the nation relegated the Tetouan nationalist notables to the margins, possibly precisely because of the role played in the colonial period and the role that they would have liked to play in the post-colonial era. The final hypothesis, without claiming to be exhaustive, is that the former leadership of the PNR attempted to carve out a leading position in the new political field of independent Morocco, oscillating between support for the King

and support for Istiqlal. However, the consolidation of the monarchy to the detriment of nationalist parties and Istiqlal's ambitions to form a single party system subjugated the former leadership of the PNR, which had already lost the centrality experienced in colonial times by joining Istiqlal. Relegated to the margins of the state-building process, the Tetouan nationalist notables turned back to Tetouan, pouring national expectations on a regional level, if not merely on an urban level, with the hypothesis of re-founding the PNR. However, just as when in the 1950s there was no need to "increase political tendencies" (Palazzoli 1974: 157), on the threshold of the new millennium there was no need to have "another Polisario".⁹⁰ Without being able to go to elections, in the 1950s as well as in the 1990s, the question remains whether the party was exclusively an expression of the ambitions of the hard core of the nationalist elite of the colonial era or if it would have really enjoyed wider support at the popular level. Finally, the historicity of the protests, as regards the former Spanish Morocco, is contained in the *northern dimension* perceived in the 2011 revolts in Tetouan. Its roots are to be found not only in the double Franco-Spanish Protectorate and in the different strategies of construction of the elites by the two colonial powers but also, and above all, in the Moroccan post-colonial era and in the clash between the two pillars of independence, the monarchy and the nationalist movement. Ultimately, the needs of the nation-state and the monarchy prevailed over the ambitions of the Tetouan nationalist notables of playing a political role at the national, regional, or local level.

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Notes:

- 1 - Translation by the author.
- 2 - Chalcraft J., "Essential Readings: Uprisings, Resistance, and Popular Mobilization in the Middle East and North Africa", *Jadaliyya*, 2021, <https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/42569/Essential-Readings-Uprisings,-Resistance,-and-Popular-Mobilization-in-the-Middle-East-and-North-Africa> (last accessed on 29 September 2022).
- 3 - Gillson Miller S., "Why History Matters in Post-2011 Morocco", *Jadaliyya*, 2016, <https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/33789/Why-History-Matters-in-Post-2011-Morocco> (last accessed on 29 September 2022).
- 4 - *Ibid.*
- 5 - According to Burke (1976: 268) Makhzen literally means "warehouse", which indicates the capacity of the sultanate to collect taxes. The term is also used to define the sultanate itself.
- 6 - Translation by the author.
- 7 - Founded in Fez in 1943 by Allal al-Fasi (1910-1974) and Ahmed Balafrej (1908-1990). In 1956 it was the largest and most qualitatively structured party in Morocco.
- 8 - The Polisario (Frente popular para la liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y Río de Oro) is a political organization constituted in 1973 for the liberation of Western Sahara.
- 9 - In Spanish the term is used to indicate something or someone in reference to the city of Tetouan. So, for example, *tetuani* elite or *tetuani* architecture.
- 10 - Interview with Abou Bakr Bennouna, Tetouan, 10 November 2021.
- 11 - For example, she was "administrator of all Tetouan's free schools" in 1948. Archivo General de la Administración (AGA), África (15) 013.001, 81/2157, Delegación de Asuntos Indígenas (DAI), Sección 2ª, Boletín de Información Marroquí (BIM) n. 31, 4 May 1948.
- 12 - She was a member of the directive of the Women's Nationalist Association. AGA, África (15) 013, 81/1898, DAI, Sección política, BIM n. 88, 25 September 1947.
- 13 - AGA, África (15), 81/2157, DAI, sin otras informaciones, 28 October 1946.
- 14 - AGA, África (15) 013, 81/05641, Intervención Territorial de Yebala (TY), Información, Tetuán, January 1955.
- 15 - Interview of the author and Antonio M. Morone with Abou Bakr Bennouna, Tetouan, 20 November 2017.
- 16 - Translation by the author.
- 17 - Translation by the author.
- 18 - According to the definitions of the Real Academia Española, "norteño" means "from the north of a country, region or territory, or related to it" while "nordista" has a meaning closely related to American history, indicating "in the American Civil War, supporter of the Northern Federal States". According to the author's interpretation, the use of the two terms is particularly evocative, for they are more than simply synonyms: the point is that, although perhaps Bennouna could be considered as a "man of the north" in the geographical and socio-cultural sense, Bennouna cannot be considered as a supporter of a "northern question", which had not yet emerged. Furthermore, if by geographical sense we mean that someone born in a northern city is from the north, then undoubtedly Bennouna is such a person, because he was born in Tetouan. From a socio-cultural point of view, the concept is ambiguous and must be problematized, as was done by Calderwood (2018) and Mateo Dieste (2003). In conclusion, the label that Ibn Azzuz Hakim gives to Bennouna reflects more his own political position at the moment in which he was interviewed by Morales Lezcano, that is 67 years after Bennouna's death, than a possible *essence* of Bennouna, as a man and a nationalist.
- 19 - Translation by the author.
- 20 - Interviews with Abou Bakr Bennouna, Tetouan, 9 August 2021 and 10 November 2021.
- 21 - Translation by the author.
- 22 - Interview with Abou Bakr Bennouna, Tetouan, 9 August 2021.
- 23 - Interview with Abou Bakr Bennouna, Tetouan, 10 November 2021.
- 24 - *Ibid.*
- 25 - *Ibid.*

- 26 - Translation by the author.
- 27 - Muhammad Ibn Azzuz Hakim, *Editorial*, "Al-Hayat (La vida). Periódico mensual independiente al servicio de los intereses del Norte y de la cooperación hispano-marroquí", n. 78, 1 March 1994, p. 1 (Spanish version).
- 28 - *Ibid.*
- 29 - '*al-Ḥayāt' min aġl māḍā?*', "Al-Hayat (La vida). Periódico mensual independiente al servicio de los intereses del Norte y de la cooperación hispano-marroquí", n. 78, 1 March 1994, p. 1 (Arabic version).
- 30 - '*al-Ḥayāt' min aġl māḍā?*', "Al-Hayat (La vida). Periódico mensual independiente al servicio de los intereses del Norte y de la cooperación hispano-marroquí", n. 78, 1 March 1994, p. 10 (Arabic version).
- 31 - *Ibid.*
- 32 - *Porque defendemos la persistencia y difusión del idioma español en Marruecos*, "Al-Hayat (La vida). Periódico mensual independiente al servicio de los intereses del Norte y de la cooperación hispano-marroquí", n. 78, 1 March 1994, p. 1 (Spanish version).
- 33 - *Ibid.*
- 34 - *Ibid.*
- 35 - Muhammad Ibn Azzuz Hakim, *Editorial*, "Al-Hayat (La vida). Periódico mensual independiente al servicio de los intereses del Norte y de la cooperación hispano-marroquí", n. 78, 1 March 1994, p. 1 (Spanish version).
- 36 - *Ibid.*
- 37 - *Ibid.*
- 38 - *Entrevista del director de "Al-Hayat" con la señora Aziza Bennani*, "Al-Hayat (La vida). Periódico mensual independiente al servicio de los intereses del Norte y de la cooperación hispano-marroquí", n. 78, 1 March 1994, p. 2 (Spanish version).
- 39 - Translation by the author.
- 40 - Translation by the author.
- 41 - Translation by the author.
- 42 - Translation by the author.
- 43 - Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco (FNFF), rollo 136, documento n. 16871, Comunicado al Gabinete Diplomático del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (MAE) enviado por el Alto Comisario de España en Marruecos, José García Valiño al ministro de Asuntos Exteriores Alberto Martín Artajo, Tetuán, 31 March 1956.
- 44 - *Ibid.*
- 45 - Muhammad Ibn Azzuz Hakim, *Al-Ustād 'Abd al-Ḥāliq al-Ṭarīs*, "Al-Hayat (La vida). Periódico mensual independiente al servicio de los intereses del Norte y de la cooperación hispano-marroquí", n. 80, 1 May 1994, p. 2 (Arabic version).
- 46 - *Wa-tahaqqāqa al-amal*, "Al-Hayat (La vida). Periódico mensual independiente al servicio de los intereses del Norte y de la cooperación hispano-marroquí", n. 80, 1 May 1994, p. 2 (Arabic version).
- 47 - *Editorial: Aleluya dicha y honor para el Norte*, "Al-Hayat (La vida). Periódico mensual independiente al servicio de los intereses del Norte y de la cooperación hispano-marroquí", n. 80, 1 May 1994, p. 1 (Spanish version).
- 48 - *Wa-tahaqqāqa al-amal*, "Al-Hayat (La vida). Periódico mensual independiente al servicio de los intereses del Norte y de la cooperación hispano-marroquí", n. 80, 1 May 1994, p. 2 (Arabic version).
- 49 - Translation by the author.
- 50 - FNFF, rollo 143, documento n. 17571, Comunicado al jefe de Estado español Francisco Franco enviado por S.M. el Rey Mohammed V con las palabras pronunciadas por Torres acreditándose como Embajador en Madrid, Rabat, 19 June 1956.
- 51 - Translation by the author.
- 52 - FNFF, rollo 139, documento n. 17063, Comunicado a la Subsecretaría del MAE enviado por el Embajador de España en Rabat, Rabat, 1 January 1957.
- 53 - FNFF, rollo 135, documento n. 16453, Comunicado a la Subsecretaría del MAE enviado por el Embajador de España en Rabat, Rabat, 31 May 1956.
- 54 - AGA, Asuntos Exteriores (AE), (10) 057.000, 54/18623, Consulado General de España en Tetuán (CGET), Boletín de Información (BI) n. 109, Oficina de Enlace e Interpretación (OEI), Tetuán, 10 January 1957.

- 55 - *Ibid.*
- 56 - AGA, AE, (10) 057.000, 54/18623, CGET, BI n. 112, Tetuán, 14 January 1957.
- 57 - AGA, AE, (10) 057.000, 54/18623, CGET, BI n. 118, OEI, Tetuán, 21 January 1957.
- 58 - AGA, AE, (10) 057.000, 54/18623, CGET, BI n. 109, OEI, Tetuán, 10 January 1957.
- 59 - AGA, África, (15) 013, 81/05641, TY, BI n. 34, Tetuán, 20 March 1956.
- 60 - Translation by the author.
- 61 - Translation by the author.
- 62 - Translation by the author.
- 63 - Translation by the author.
- 64 - AGA, África (15) 013.001, 81/02377, DAI, Delegación General, Cancillería Majzén, Dahir sobre nombramiento ministro de Acción Social, Tetuán, 29 December 1954.
- 65 - AGA, África (15) 013, 81/05641, TY, Prensa Árabe, Boletín n. 3, Nota n. 9, 12 January 1955.
- 66 - Translation by the author.
- 67 - Translation by the author.
- 68 - Translation by the author.
- 69 - Translation by the author.
- 70 - Translation by the author.
- 71 - AGA, África (15) 013, 81/05641, Jefatura Local de Policía a la Territorial de Yebala, Tetuán, 26 March 1956.
- 72 - AGA, Presidencia de Gobierno (09) 017.002, 51/19080, Secretaría Política, Delegación Nacional del Servicio Exterior de la Falange Española y de las J.O.N.S., Tánger, June 1957.
- 73 - *Ibid.*
- 74 - AGA, AE (10)057.000, 54/18623, CGET, BI n. 117, Tetuán, 19 January 1957.
- 75 - Interview with Abou Bakr Bennouna, Tetouan, 10 November 2021.
- 76 - *Ibid.*
- 77 - Interview of the author and Antonio M. Morone with Ahmed Jdid, Tetouan, 24 August 2021.
- 78 - Interview with Abou Bakr Bennouna, Tetouan, 10 November 2021.
- 79 - *Ibid.*
- 80 - AGA, AE (10) 057.000, 54/18624, CGET, BI n. 136, Tetuán, 18 June 1958.
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