

Pubblicazione quadrimestrale
numero 1-2 / 2018

afriche e orienti

www.comune.bologna.it/iperbole/africheorienti

rivista di studi ai confini tra africa mediterraneo e medio oriente

anno XX numero 1-2 / 2018

L'Africa tra vecchie e nuove potenze

a cura di
Arrigo Pallotti e Maria Stella Rognoni

AIEP EDITORE



Africa's Place in Turkey's Foreign Policy: From Doubts to Normalization

Mehmet Ozkan

41

Without any exaggeration, the rise of Turkey in Africa as an actor in multiple areas can be considered as a novelty in the foreign policy of Ankara. From development assistance to investments, from politics to security, Turkey is now an influential player in African politics. Since 2005, the biggest question for Turkey's African policy was whether or not Ankara could sustain its new policy toward the continent if any economic, social and political instability occurs within Turkish domestic politics. Turkey has faced immense difficulties in the last four years domestically. Terrorism threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the Kurdistan Worker's Party (Kurdistan Isci Partisi- PKK) and the experience of an unsuccessful military coup attempt on 15 July 2016, have not diminished Ankara's interest for Africa. Relations have continued as in the past and now it can be argued that even the most drastic developments in Turkey are unlikely to change the course of these relations. This article analyses the developments in Turkey-Africa relations since the end of the Cold War and evaluates the future of these relations in the coming years.

Contextualizing Africa in Turkish foreign policy

In the 1990s Turkey tried to figure out its role in global politics in the post-Cold War period. Many domestic political crises prevented Ankara from developing a comprehensive foreign policy approach to the rest of the world. However, the main goal of becoming member of the European Union (EU) received a cold shoulder from the EU. In that sense, Turkey's current Africa policy was mostly a response to the EU's rejection of Turkey as a candidate member in 1997. As a result of this rejection, Turkey's political elites started to consider different options in expanding its foreign policy. The main focus of this re-orientation effort was on traditionally neglected areas, such as Africa, Latin America and Asia. These modest opening plans could not be launched, however, until four years later, due to political and economic turbulence in the country (Ozkan, Akgun 2010). Coherent and consistent policy implementation was finally possible when Turkey's Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi - AK Party) replaced a three-party coalition in 2002 (Ozkan 2011).

Since the AK Party came to power in 2002, there has been a huge transformation in Turkish foreign policy. Until the early 2000s, Turkey had largely followed a one-dimensional foreign policy based on Western orientation, despite different push factors coming from society to reach out to different parts of the world such as the Middle East, Africa, Asia and the Balkans. In those years, the state elite mostly acted upon the need to satisfy the social pressure whenever a crisis emerged, such as during the Bosnia war, but these shifts were neither deep-rooted nor comprehensive, rather based on *ad hoc* policies. Since 2002, one can talk of a 'period of openings' to previously neglected regions of the world in Turkish foreign policy. These openings not only have occurred in economic and political terms, but have also strong social and religious dimensions. The latter is a novel phenomenon in Turkey's conventional approach to foreign policy because the country is constitutionally a secular state.

Economic openings are central to Turkey's efforts to reposition itself in a changing global economy. The struggle to redefine a worldview, which concentrated on economics, laid the foundations for the definition of a new 'national role' and foreign policy orientation, which have manifested themselves even more during the AK Party era. Under Erdogan's leadership, Turkey has been trying to develop a new regional and global perspective based especially on historical and cultural components. Ankara's proactive and dynamic openings towards different regions of the world have been systematic and important initiatives rather than being appendages to its relations with the West (Davutoglu 2008).

The political goals of Turkey's openings are to increase Ankara's activities in all regions and international organizations, and to strengthen Turkey's contribution to regional and global peace. In that sense, Turkey wants to display an active presence in all international and regional organizations and has determined its foreign policy inclinations within this framework.¹ Turkey's observer status in the African Union, its

partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), its active stance in the G-20 and its non-permanent member status in the UN Security council during 2008-2010 have to be evaluated within this framework.

Ankara's African policy can be properly understood only if one considers the overall foreign policy change in Turkey. Within this context, the articulation of Ankara's African policy can be divided in five phases. Each of them indicates a different level of understanding of, and approach to, the continent. The period between the AK Party's rise to power in 2002 and the designation of 2005 as the 'Year of Africa', represented a preliminary stage in Turkey's foreign policy towards Africa. It was during these years that initial assessments of Africa's potential were made and Turkish officials held lower-level meetings with their African counterparts. The designation of 2005 as the 'Year of Africa' represented an unmistakable sign of Turkey's commitment to building stronger relations with Africa (Siradag 2013). The second period, which started in 2005 and ended with the First Turkey-Africa Summit in 2008, marked a period of diversification of relations across a range of areas, including politics and the economy. During this period, Turkey-Africa relations made more progress than the Turkish authorities had initially predicted, while both sides became more familiar with their counterparts. The third period began with the 2008 Turkey-Africa summit and ended when then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's historical August 2011 visited the Somalian capital Mogadishu. This was when Turkey-Africa relations assumed a multi-dimensional nature. While the Turkish government opened embassies in various African countries, the nation's trade volume with Africa quadrupled from \$4 billion to approximately \$18 billion. Following phase one's formative nature, phases two and three intensified the complexity of Turkey's Africa policy.

It was during the fourth period, which began with Erdogan's official visit to Somalia, that Turkey-Africa relations evolved into a more mature political relationship (Ozkan, Orakci 2015). In 2011, the Turkish government's Somalia initiative entailed a focus on high politics, i.e., political matters and security issues, in addition to mere economic relations and humanitarian or development aid. The restoration of relative public order and the world's renewed interest in the Somali conflict, made Turkey a prominent stakeholder whose opinions were widely appreciated. As a result of this, the Turkish authorities met with representatives from the EU, Great Britain, Spain, Norway and the United States, among others, on African issues (Davutoglu 2012). In this period, Turkey consolidated its position as an important actor in Africa.

The end of 2014 marked the beginning of the fifth period in Turkey-Africa relations. This period arguably has focused on the 'normalisation' and institutionalisation of relations. Therefore, this period is of particular importance, as it holds the key to consolidating existing achievements and developing a more systematic approach. At that point, there had been two pressing issues at hand. First, most of the African leaders attending the first Turkey-Africa Summit in 2008 were reported to have had serious doubts about

the sincerity of Turkey's interest for the continent and had raised questions about the Turkish agenda. However, in the Second Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, in November 2014 paved the way for the full normalisation of the Turkish government's relations with African countries. The Malabo Summit focused on the possibility of expanded cooperation and the maximization of mutual benefits, thereby assuaging the African leaders' concerns.² A second imperative for this phase has been to deepen and broaden the relationships with the African countries. So far, government agencies including the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı - TİKA), the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), and the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı - Diyanet), have sought to independently explore the African continent and to develop their own perspectives. This has resulted in further diversification of Turkey's interactions on the continent (Kavas 2006).

Overall, Turkey's mode of engagement with Africa has been a slowly deepening process with new elements being added as time passed. Similarly, new actors and institutions from the Turkish bureaucracy have also been involved in shaping African policy, while African partners' interests in developing these relations have also gradually increased. One can now view the relationship between Turkey and Africa as fully-developed with all relevant actors contributing. This process has thus led to the normalization of these relations at the social, political and economic level. Turkey has transitioned from being a 'new' entrant into the African continent to being an increasingly established partner with Africa.

From benign involvement to principal actor: Turkey in Africa

Over the past five years, Turkey has significantly expanded its diplomatic network in the continent by opening new embassies and bringing the total number of its embassies to 39 (to be 41 in 2018), along with four consulates.³ The number of African diplomatic missions in Ankara, in turn, has risen from 16 to 32 in the last decade. High-level official visits take place in an increasingly frequent manner.⁴

The annual trade volume between Turkey and Africa rose from \$5,5 billion in 2004 to \$23 billion in 2015. The total amount of Turkish investments in Africa has broken the \$6 billion-dollar mark.⁵ Since 2010 several dozen international agreements have been signed in order to promote commercial and economic cooperation and to establish bilateral business councils. Agreements have been concluded with countries such as Ethiopia, South Africa, Somalia, and Kenya, amongst others (Ozkan 2013). Meanwhile, Turkish Airlines continues to operate direct flights to 46 destinations in 28 African countries. In seeking to build up African human capital, the YTB covers the cost of education in Turkish universities for hundreds of African students.

The Second Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit, as already mentioned, strengthened the

perception that Turkey's Africa policy has entered a new era. At this summit, the parties signed a joint action plan for 2014–2019 whereby they decided to elevate their relations to the level of strategic partnership. As this long-term plan showed the seriousness of the commitment of both parties to this relationship, it also indicated that Turkey's African policy contributed to making the country more relevant and visible in the international arena. This is consistent with the activities associated with phase five of Turkey's evolving relationship with Africa, which involved the normalisation and institutionalisation of Turkey's international relations.

Aid and humanitarianism: entering the field

Although Turkey's relationship with Africa has evolved and become increasingly complex, Turkish authorities remain aware of the importance of humanitarian assistance in Ankara's relations with the African continent (Hasimi 2014). Turkey sees the humanitarian dimension as an entry point to the continent. In line with this policy, TIKA has established representation offices in 21 countries in Africa. In the last decade, aid has been one of the strongest foreign policy elements in Turkey's foreign policy in general, and its Africa policy in particular. It has been arguably part of the country's soft power strategy.⁶

TIKA currently has operations in over 40 countries in Africa as part of Ankara's developmental aid policy. TIKA was initially established to help in the reconstruction of the states after their independence in Central Asia in 1992. However, after the year 2003, the organisation has been transformed into a more global aid agency and has expanded its area of operation, which today includes Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia. By doing so, Turkey has shown a strong willingness to widen the cooperation with Africa, particularly with regard to projects that provide technical assistance to the African countries. Turkey's former President Abdullah Gul explained that Turkey attempted to build relations with Africa by making "health, education, agriculture, environment, infrastructure and capacity-building" strategic areas of its cooperation policy.⁷ These areas continue to basically constitute the essence of Turkey's aid to Africa.

Besides the activities of TIKA, Turkey has also utilised international organisations to provide aid to Africa. For example, through the World Health Organisation, World Food Programme (WFP), and the Red Crescent, Turkey has donated \$7.5 million to various African countries to assist them to cope with the negative effects of drought and other natural disasters. The amounts, however, are very small. In 2008, Turkey allocated \$3.5 million as humanitarian aid through the WFP,⁸ while in 2009 made a modest donation of half a million dollars to the African Union budget.⁹ In a similar vein, in 2007, Turkey, for the first time hosted a summit of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), in Istanbul, 33 of which are in Africa (out of 49 members). During this summit, Turkey committed \$20 million in development aid for these countries. To show Turkey's commitment to

the development of the LDCs, Ankara also hosted the fourth conference on the Least Developed Countries in the first half of 2011.

Trade and institutional cooperation: making relations meaningful

Nothing can better summarise the change in Turkey-Africa relations than the increasing trade and institutional cooperation between the two partners. As mentioned above, the year 2005 was a turning point in Turkey's relations with Africa. In that year Turkey obtained observer status within the African Union (AU), which later declared it a strategic partner in January 2008. In May 2008, Turkey joined the African Development Bank and strengthened its relations with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in East Africa and the Economic Community of West African States (Ozkan 2010). The Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (Dis Ekonomik Iliskiler Kurulu - DEIK) established eight Business Councils as part of Ankara's attempts to increase business activities with Africa.

In general, Turkey's approach to developing trade with the African nations seems to differ from that of a number of countries seeking business opportunities on the continent, whose overriding interests are Africa's oil resources. As a mid-sized nation with a developing economy, Turkey carries none of the free market capitalist baggage aimed at securing the best deal at any cost that Africans so resent. By concentrating on lower profile development issues such as agriculture, arguably Turkish initiatives carry the promise of affecting a genuine change in the lives of many African citizens. Moreover, several Turkish officials have stressed in public that Turkey's interest for Africa is based on exchanging competencies and technologies with the countries of the continent. While these developments at the political and institutional level are important, rising bilateral trade underwrites Turkey's relationship with Africa. Turkey's trade volume with the African countries was only \$5.4 billion in 2003. It increased more than twofold to exceed \$16 billion in 2008 and despite the economic crisis it did not lose its pace, reaching around \$23 billion in 2015.¹⁰ Yet, considering Turkey's total trade volume with the world as a whole, current trade volumes with African countries are not very significant. Nonetheless, Turkey's target is to increase trade volumes with Africa to around \$50 billion by 2023.

Constructive State-building: the Somali experience

In August 2011, shortly after famine was officially declared in parts of Southern and Central Somalia, Erdogan led a delegation composed of four ministers and members of Turkey's cultural and business elite to visit Mogadishu. This was the first visit to Mogadishu by a head of state or government from outside Africa in almost 20 years (Ali 2011), and marked the start of a sustained increase in Turkish engagement in Somalia. In January 2015, Erdogan – now as President of Turkey – returned to Mogadishu, for

talks with the government and to inaugurate several projects, including a hospital built with Turkish support. Both visits were widely celebrated, and Erdogan personally appeared to be quite popular, especially in Mogadishu, where most of Turkey's aid projects are concentrated. However, Turkey's engagement has not been without its opponents. In July 2013, the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu was attacked, leaving one dead and three Turkish security force members wounded.¹¹ Shortly before President Erdogan's January 2105 visit, militants attacked the hotel where the Turkish forward planning team was based. Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin ('al-Shabaab') claimed responsibility for both attacks.

Ankara's involvement in Somalia can be explained with a special focus on three approaches. Humanitarianism has been the main theme and since the beginning this has been one of the most pronounced official discourses on Somalia. Humanitarianism does not only have the components of emergency aid, but also included a development aid aspect. With a mixture of both aid policies, Turkey has become a prominent player in Somalia.¹² The second aspect of Turkey's Somalia policy is related to the implementation of its development policies. There has been a convergence of state apparatus and civil society organisations on the ground (Wasuge 2016). Albeit lacking in coordination, this unofficial coalition has boosted Turkey's overall visibility in Somalia. Most importantly, Turkish developmental activities in Somalia, irrespective of whether carried out by state institutions or civil society, have been attributed to Turkey, making it appear as if Ankara is the initiator. The third aspect of Ankara's involvement is to be found in its regional approach. Turkey has realised that the 'Somalia issue' goes beyond the nation-state, and includes regional and global dimensions.¹³ This policy has mostly stemmed from a geopolitical understanding that without solving the regional balance any peace in Somalia is likely to be temporary. In the Fifth Annual Meeting of Ambassadors in Ankara, in January 2013, then-Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu demonstrated Turkey's recognition of the issue at hand, when he announced Turkey's integrated strategy for Eastern Africa as a whole.

Turkey has delivered more than \$500 million in aid to Somalia through its developmental and humanitarian projects.¹⁴ Turkey's developmental and humanitarian projects have focused on six aspects: transport (air and road linkages), infrastructure (roads, airport, renovations, water and sanitation), healthcare (building hospitals and supplying and training healthcare workers), education (provision of scholarships and building of schools), religion (training of Imams and restoration of mosques), and traditional humanitarian activities (refugee camps and orphanages). Many Turkish NGOs have also been active in the country, especially in central and southern Somalia. Turkish NGOs have circumvented restrictions on foreign organisations by working with local Somali NGOs to deliver aid and implement their projects, or, in some cases, coordinated their projects from their headquarters in Turkey.

Rising security provider in Africa

A new but significant component of Turkey-Africa relations is currently developing: security. Turkey has always been hesitant to export security through its foreign policy, but this is changing now. Since long time, Turkey has had military presence in some UN missions, such as in Lebanon; and this was part of Ankara's commitment to global peace. However, according to the new foreign policy of Turkey, contributing troops to international peace missions is not considered as 'sufficient' in terms of Ankara's geopolitical interests. In 2017, Turkey opened two military bases. One is based in Qatar and the other one is in Somalia.

Since 2011 Turkey has tried to foster security in Africa. The security elements of Turkey-Africa relations have basically three dimensions. First, Turkey has contributed to the international efforts aimed at ensuring peace and stability in Africa. As of August 2015, Turkey took part in seven of the nine existing UN missions in Africa with its police and military officers. In addition, by the end of 2014, military training was provided in Turkey for 2,200 military personnel from over 20 African countries. For the period of 2015-2016 Turkey is expected to receive more than 1,200 African military personnel for training.¹⁵ Second, Turkey has contributed to the security of international trade, particularly maritime security, via its efforts in the Horn of Africa. Since 2009, Turkey has taken an active role in combatting piracy in the Gulf of Aden and has provided military support to fight against piracy in cooperation with the EU and the UN. Thus far, four frigates have been deployed consecutively to combat piracy.

48 Third, security also underpins Ankara's state-building efforts in Somalia. Turkey, for instance, provides support to the Somali central government in the area of training security services. Turkey dedicated a budget of 20 million Turkish Lira for the restructuring of the Somali army and its police forces since 2011.¹⁶ One of its projects is to build a non-commissioned officer school with a capacity of 100 student-officers in the first phase, followed by plans to start building the foundations of professional military ground, air, and naval schools. Turkey's General Directorate of Security, the Turkish General Staff, and the Ministry of Foreign affairs have conducted various studies on how to best restructure the Somali army and police forces. Building infrastructure, re-structuring, and training the Somali police are all part of Turkey's development assistance. To this end, it has brought 60 Somali police officers to Turkey for training, through the General Directorate of Security. The latter has also prepared the design of their police uniforms. Subsequently, a police team of more than 500 police officers has come gradually to Turkey for training over the last three years.¹⁷

Al-Shabaab (an extremist group that controls much of Southern Somalia) has launched periodic attacks against Turkish targets. Its goal is to try and deter Turkey from continuing its aid activities in the country. For instance, in an attack targeting a Red Crescent aid convoy on 15 April 2013 fifteen Somali aid workers were killed and four Turks were wounded. Also, a Turkish businessman was assassinated at the hotel he was staying in Mogadishu on 25 May 2012. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for two

more recent deadly attacks. One of these attacks was a suicide attacks aimed at public buildings in Mogadishu in October 2011 that led to the deaths of 70 students to whom Turkey had provided scholarships. This attack was perceived as an attack against Turkey. Turkey sent an air ambulance to treat the surviving injured students. Another major attack was a direct attack on a Turkish target. It was carried out by a suicide bomber located in a building close to the Turkish Embassy on 27 July 2013 in Mogadishu. One of four Turkish special operations police was killed in the clash, while others were injured. Al-Shabaab accepted the responsibility and blamed Turkey for supporting a non-Islamic and secular structure in Somalia on their twitter.

Turkey has set up its biggest overseas military base in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, in October 2017, so increasing Ankara's presence in the Horn of Africa as a whole. The military base aims to train 10,000 Somali troops and has the capacity to train at least 1,500 soldiers at a time. The military base is likely to boost Turkey's soft power in the region and enhance its status as an essential player in regional security. However, Turkey's intention goes beyond this. In a visit to Sudan in December 2017, President Erdogan officially asked his Sudanese counterpart for the renovation of the Suakin Island, which Ottomans used as a port to secure Hejaz province – present-day western Saudi Arabia – from attacks on the Red Sea front in the past. The island has both strategic and historical importance for Turkey. Historically, until the 19th century, Suakin was the capital of the Ottoman Empire's Habesh Eyalet, which is today's Eritrea, Djibouti and Northern Somalia. Strategically, it is a port city located Northeast of Sudan. Suakin was also the most significant port in Nubia. After the establishment of Port Sudan, Suakin diminished in importance. Ankara's goal is not only to revive the island and strengthen Turkey-Sudan relations, but also to open another military base in the future. If that happens, Ankara's role as a military actor not only will be strengthened, but also will add a different dimension to Turkey-Africa relations.

Challenges and future of the relations

As explained previously, Turkey started its relations with Africa with a heavy focus on the delivery of aid and humanitarian assistance, but it went beyond this, and rapidly added a trade dimension and strengthened a state-building and security component. However, despite the presence of this positive trajectory, Turkey-Africa relations are not without risks. One can argue that there are two fundamental risks concerning the future direction of Turkey's relations with the African continent. The first issue relates to the emerging 'Africa fatigue' in the country, which has developed due to a lack of sophisticated vision. The original vision that informed the opening period after 2002 has elapsed and now an expanded vision and accompanying plan are needed. This problem, which presents itself inside certain government agencies today, could possibly reduce the African initiative from an effort to reposition Turkey in the global economic and political system, into a mere diversion in foreign policy.

Another key problem relates to the potential influence of domestic developments on

Turkey's Africa policy. It is no secret that as an ally of AK Party until 2013, the Gülen Movement or Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) had pioneered the nation's efforts in the African continent through a network of charter schools and the activities of businessmen close to them. Since the 17 December 2013 political fallout and failed military coup on 15 July 2016 by Gulenists, the latter have sought to compensate for their losses at home by discrediting the Turkish government and by strengthening their ties to the local elite in many African countries. However, considering that the power struggle in Turkey is unlikely to end over the short term, these developments could possibly contribute to closer cooperation between Ankara and African capitals, since the Turkish authorities are increasingly likely to develop a more direct and comprehensive policy toward the continent. In this sense, various aspects of Turkey-Africa relations will continue to remain at the forefront of public attention in the foreseeable future. At present, the Turkish government's efforts tend to be appreciated across the continent. It is possible, nonetheless, to identify certain shortcomings. The most important point right now relates to the challenging task of making the country's efforts matter on a regional and global scale.

Until 2011, many key African countries believed that Turkey's sudden interest in African politics was primarily economically motivated – which is why they concentrated on short-term benefits at the expense of the Turkish government's long-term contributions. Ankara's policy toward Somalia, however, helped transform African leaders' perceptions of Turkey at the national and regional level.¹⁸ Furthermore, official visits by Turkish leaders made positive contributions to Turkey's image in the continent. The upcoming years, though, will put Turkey's position as a security actor alongside other critical players such as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to the test. In terms of the emerging powers' role in Africa, one can argue that Turkey's place is now firmly secured as an emerging power in the continent especially with regard to trade and humanitarian aid.

Domestically, in Turkey the biggest challenge is the lack of understanding and interest regarding Africa both in policy-circles and academia. This continues to be a valid issue, despite more than a decade of engagement with the continent. There still remains an acute shortage of trained Turkish experts on African affairs. Although various Turkish institutions have launched Africa research centres in previous years, these organisations remain both ill-equipped and prone to reproducing extremely Orientalist approaches that are on the verge of becoming obsolete in the West. In this sense, the Turkish government is required to take the necessary steps to encourage graduate students and doctoral candidates to specialise in African studies in an effort to follow continental developments more closely. Furthermore, Turkish universities may establish Africa research centres to host lectures by prominent Africanist academics in order to familiarise the continent's leading minds with Turkey.

Concluding remarks

In general, Turkey's opening to Africa is a result of both Turkey's domestic transformation and change in the global political economy. Turkey's domestic transformation has challenged the traditional Turkish economic partners and led to a diversification of trade partners in line with the changes in the global political-economy power configuration. Changes in the international system led countries to redefine their own interest in a newly emerging system. Turkey's response to such changes has been to define a multidimensional foreign policy and developing economic and political relations with not only immediate neighbours, but also other regions and continents. Turkey's Africa opening is part and parcel of this new redefinition of Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey's Africa opening is, so far, the most successful opening in foreign policy in terms of economic, political and social gains. Relations between African countries and Ankara have turned to be mutually beneficial for both parts and this has created a momentum and willingness to deepen these ties. Turkey's president Erdogan has visited 28 African countries since 2004, and has paid official visit to some countries more than once. Today, the Turkish people consider Africa as a natural ally and the policies toward Africa are so normalized that nobody – even opposition parties – criticize these relations at all. Some African issues, like that of Somalia, are literally internalized and now are considered as part of Turkey's domestic agenda. However, this normalization has generated a sort of Africa fatigue as well, because the 'opening' discourse is no longer a sufficient motivation to mobilize all Turkish institutions with enthusiasm as it happened in the last decade. Turkey needs to create a new Africa vision to counter that fatigue. Turkey-Africa relations are likely to consolidate in the coming years. Politically speaking, more engagement with Africa has created a better understanding of Africa and its potentials for Turkey. Whether the global and domestic developments may bring any change both in the nature and speed of Turkey-Africa relations is yet to be seen. However, redefinition of Africa both at conceptual and political levels in Turkish foreign policy represents a novelty.

Dr. Mehmet Ozkan is a Senior Fellow with the Center for Global Policy in Washington DC, USA. He previously taught as Associate Professor of International Relations at Turkish National Police Academy in Ankara, Turkey; Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Bogota, Colombia; and International University of Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

NOTES:

- 1 - A. Davutoglu, *Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy*, Address by H.E. Foreign Minister of Republic of Turkey at the SETA Foundation's Washington D.C. Branch, 8 December 2009: <http://www.setadc.org/images/stories/food/FM%20of%20Turkey%20A.Davutoglu%20Address%20at%20SETA-DC%2012-08-2009.pdf>.
- 2 - I. Kalin, *A New Phase in Turkish-African Relations*, in «Daily Sabah» (on-line), 22 November 2014: <https://www.dailysabah.com/columns/ibrahim-kalin/2014/11/22/a-new-phase-in-turkish-african-relations>.
- 3 - I. Kalin, *Connecting with Africa in a Multipolar World*, in «Daily Sabah» (on-line), 29 December 2017: <https://www.dailysabah.com/columns/ibrahim-kalin/2017/12/30/connecting-with-africa-in-a-multipolar-world>.
- 4 - *Turkey-Africa Relations*, "Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs", 10 May 2016: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>.
- 5 - *Turkish Envoy Foresees Vibrant Cooperation with Africa*, in «Hurriyet Daily News» (on-line), 25 March 2016: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-envoy-foresees-vibrant-cooperation-with-africa-.aspx?pageID=238&tnID=96933&NewsCatID=510>.
- 6 - R. Lough, *Turkey Tries out Soft Power in Somalia*, in «Reuters» (on-line), 3 June 2012: <http://www.reuters.com/article/somalia-turkey-idUSL5E8GP2LP20120603>.
- 7 - A. Gul, *Africa's Development Needs: State of Implementation of Various Commitments, Challenges and the Way Forward*, Remarks by President of Turkey in New York, 22 September 2008: <http://www.un.org/ga/president/62/ThematicDebates/adn/turkey.pdf>.
- 8 - *Africa: Turkey Donates \$3.5 Million for Africa-Turkey Summit to Be Held Next Week*, in «Daily Monitor» (on-line), 13 August 2008: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200808130809.html>.
- 9 - African Union Commission, *The Government of the Republic of Turkey Made a Donation to the African Union Budget*, African Press Organisation, 3 March 2009: <https://appablog.wordpress.com/2009/03/03/the-government-of-the-republic-of-turkey-made-a-donation-to-the-african-union-budget/>.
- 10 - Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), *Turkey-Africa Relations*, 10 May 2016: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>.
- 11 - F. Omar, A. Sheikh, *Al-Shabaab Claim Attack on Turkish Mission in Somalia, Three Dead*, in «Reuters» (on-line), 27 July 2013: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-conflict-idUSBRE96Q0A420130728>.
- 12 - M. Akgun, *Somali'de Yeni Bir Devlet İnşaa Ediyoruz*, in «Star» (on-line), 22 December 2012: <http://haber.stargazete.com/yazar/somalide-yeni-bir-devlet-insa-ediyoruz/yazi-714006>.
- 13 - S. Orakci, *Somali'nin geleceği ve 2015 hedefleri*, in «DunyaBulteni» (on-line), 28 May 2012: <http://www.dunyabulteni.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=211627>.
- 14 - A. Arman, *Erdogan: The Hero of Somalia*, in «Al-Jazeera» (on-line), 21 January 2015: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/01/visit-erdogan-somalia-2015121124331818818.html>.
- 15 - F. Sinirlioglu, *Turkey in Africa; A Humanitarian Approach*, in «The New Times» (on-line), 17 November 2015: <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-11-17/194445/>.
- 16 - *TSK Somali Askerini Eğitecek*, in «TimeTurk» (on-line), 4 March 2013: http://www.timeturk.com/tr/2013/03/04/tsk-somali-askerini-egitecek.html#.UOKBvqh_uBl.
- 17 - *bid.*
- 18 - M. Harper, *The Unlikely Love Affair between Two Countries*, "BBC News", 15 December 2014: <https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-30447039>.

References

- Ali A. (2011), *Turkey's Foray into Africa: A New Humanitarian Power?*, in «Insight Turkey», vol. 13, n. 4
- Davutoglu A. (2008), *Turkey's New Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007*, in «Insight Turkey», vol. 10, n. 1
- Davutoglu A. (2012), *2013 Yılına Girerken Dış Politikamız*, Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Ankara
- Hasimi C. (2014), *Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development Cooperation*, in «Insight Turkey», vol. 16, n. 1
- Kavas A. (2006), *Osmanlı Afrika İlişkileri*, Tasam, İstanbul
- Ozkan M., B. Akgun (2010), *Turkey's Opening to Africa*, in «The Journal of Modern African Studies», vol. 48, n. 4
- Ozkan M. (2011), *Turkey's 'New' Engagements in Africa and Asia: Scope, Content and Implications*, in «Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs», vol. 16, n. 3

- Ozkan M. (2013), *Does "Rising Power" Mean "Rising Donor"? Turkey's Development Aid in Africa*, in «Africa Review», vol. 5, n. 2
- Ozkan M., B. Akgun (2010), *Turkey's Opening to Africa*, in «The Journal of Modern African Studies», vol. 48, n. 4
- Ozkan M., S. Orakci (2015), *Turkey as a "Political" Actor in Africa – An Assessment of Turkish Involvement in Somalia*, in «Journal of Eastern African Studies», vol. 9, n. 2
- Siradag A. (2013), *The Making of the New Turkish Foreign and Security Policy towards Africa: The Rationale, Roots and Dynamics*, in «Africa Insight», vol. 43, n. 1
- Wasuge M. (2016), *Turkey's Assistance Model in Somalia: Achieving Much with Little*, The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, Mogadishu

ISBN 978-8860861511



9 788860 861511

ISSN 1592-6753

€ 13,00

Numeri pubblicati

- 1/99 Esili e memoria
2/99 I conflitti in Africa
3/99 La transizione in Sudafrica
4/99 Elezioni e transizioni politiche in Africa
1/00 Comunicazione, immagini, linguaggi
2/00 Processi di pace e conflitti in Sudan
3-4/00 Emigrare, immigrare, transmigrare
1/01 Informalità, illegalità e politiche pubbliche in Africa
2/01 Cultura popolare, sviluppo e democrazia
3-4/01 Sguardi antropologici sul turismo
1/02 La crisi in Afghanistan e Asia centrale
2/02 Migrazioni e xenofobia in Africa australe
3/02 Quale politica dell'Italia in Africa e nel Mediterraneo?
4/02 Idee di islam
Speciale 2003 USA-Iraq le ragioni di un conflitto
1/03 Culture coloniali e letterature dell'Africa sub-sahariana
2/03 La crisi in Zimbabwe
3-4/03 Economia e politiche dell'acqua
Speciale 2004 Voci di donne nel cinema dell'Africa e del Mediterraneo
1-2/04 Conflitto e transizione in Congo
3/04 Movimenti e conflitti sociali in Africa
4/2004 - 1/2005 Scritture dei conflitti
2/05 Ambiente e sviluppo sostenibile in Africa australe
3/05 Migranti africani in Italia: etnografie
4/05 Parole parlate. Comunicazione orale fra tradizione e modernità
Speciale I 2006 Stato-nazione e movimenti nazionalisti nell'Africa australe post-coloniale
Speciale II 2006 Occidente e Africa. Democrazia e nazionalismo dalla prima alla seconda transizione
1-2/06 Sudan 1956-2006: cinquant'anni di indipendenza
3-4/06 Trasformazioni democratiche in Africa
1/07 Il ritorno della memoria coloniale
Speciale 2007 Terra e risorse naturali in Africa. Quali diritti?
2/07 Narrative di migrazione, diaspore ed esili
3-4/07 Fondamentalismi nell'Africa del XXI secolo
1/08 Mondo arabo. Cittadini e welfare sociale
Speciale I 2008 Africa australe. Comunità rurali, sistemi di autorità e politiche di decentramento
Speciale II 2008 Decentralising Power and Resource Control in sub-Saharan Africa

- 2/08 La Cina in Africa
3-4/08 Donne e diritti sociali in Africa
Speciale I 2009 AIDS, povertà e democrazia in Africa
1-2/09 Africa in Europa: strategie e forme associative
Speciale II 2009 La povertà in Africa sub-sahariana: approcci e politiche
3-4/09 La schiavitù dalle colonie degli imperi alle trasmissioni postcoloniali
1/10 Il calcio in Sudafrica: identità, politica ed economia
Speciale 2010 Controllare la natura. Politiche di tutela ambientale in Africa sub-sahariana
2/10 Transnazionalismo dei saperi e ONG islamiche nell'Africa occidentale
3-4/10 La crisi afghana e il contesto regionale
1-2/11 Unione Europea e Africa
Speciale I 2011 Sviluppo rurale e riduzione della povertà in Etiopia
3-4/11 Cittadinanza e politiche dell'appartenenza in Africa sub-sahariana
Speciale II 2011 L'Africa sub-sahariana negli anni '70
1-2/12 Percorsi della democrazia in Africa
Speciale AIDS 2012 HIV/AIDS e comunità rurali in Africa australe: sudditi o cittadini?
3-4/12 Giovani in Africa. Prospettive antropologiche
1-2/13 Linee di conflitto: il mondo arabo in trasformazione
3-4/13 Fronti della guerra fredda in Africa sub-sahariana
1-2/14 Partiti islamisti e relazioni internazionali in Nord Africa e Medio Oriente
3/14 Il Rwanda a vent'anni dal genocidio
Speciale 2014 La questione della terra in Mozambico fra diritti delle comunità e investimenti
Speciale 2015 Rural Development and Poverty Reduction in Southern Africa: Experiences from Zambia and Malawi
1-2/15 Stato e società in Egitto e Tunisia: involuzioni ed evoluzioni
3/15 The New Harvest. Agrarian Policies and Rural Transformation in Southern Africa
1/16 I movimenti delle donne in Nord Africa e Medio Oriente: percorsi e generazioni "femministe" a confronto
2-3/16 Le pratiche dello Stato in Africa: spazi sociali e politici contestati
1/17 Storie dell'Africa e fonti nell'era della "rivoluzione digitale"
2/17 Frontiere, confini e zone di frontiera nella regione MENA
3/17 International Solidarities and the Liberation of the Portuguese Colonies