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## International Solidarities and the Liberation of the Portuguese Colonies

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# Achievements and Limitations of Yugoslavia's Policy in Angola during 1960s and 1970s

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9

## Introduction

The Angolan struggle against the Portuguese colonizers lasted for almost a decade and a half (1961–1975) and was followed by a bloody civil war.<sup>1</sup> However, neither the liberation war nor the subsequent struggle for power remained a purely Angolan matter. From the very beginning, the Angolan independence became a serious international issue, and various regional, international and global actors became involved in it by supporting one or more sides taking part in the conflict. Yugoslavia was among them.<sup>2</sup> After the break with the Soviet Union and a short phase of searching for ideological and political allies in the West, already in the first half of the 1950s Yugoslav diplomacy 'discovered' the potentials of cooperation with the newly liberated non-European countries as a way out of the bloc allegiances.<sup>3</sup> Early on, Yugoslavs became aware that this cooperation had to be based on universal political principles and mutual interests rather than on ideological identification or regional alliance. No later than 1952 it was 'clear' to them that the "coexistence of states with different social systems" was the main issue facing the "forces struggling for world peace".<sup>4</sup> Non-alignment soon became the cornerstone of Yugoslavia's ideology (Jakovina 2010: 24), and a distinctive feature of its foreign policy. Yugoslavs themselves put in much effort to underline their distinctiveness from other actors interested in the 'Angolan case'. To that aim,

the domestic ideological and socio-economical system of self-management socialism served as a source of foreign political legitimacy<sup>5</sup> and the fruitfulness of cooperation with both East and West was steadily underlined in order to make Yugoslavia's political orientation appealing. During her visit to Yugoslavia in 1976, Maria Eugénia da Silva Neto, Agostinho Neto's spouse, underlined that Yugoslavia had "a special place in Angola and in our hearts", continuing that they would never forget that the Yugoslavs remained their friends "during the hardest moments".<sup>6</sup> Were the words of Mrs. Neto only courteous phrases or had the Yugoslavs really deserved the 'special place' in the Angolan hearts? What were the sources of Yugoslavia's influence in Angola, what were the reaches of its policy, what stood in the way, and, ultimately, what was the outcome of Yugoslav-Angolan cooperation during 1960s and 1970s?

### Setting the stage

Yugoslavia's political engagement had global reaches. One of the preconditions for a worldwide political involvement was a developed network of contacts and information sources. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Yugoslavia was rapidly expanding the number of its diplomatic outposts in Africa, continued being active in the UN forums, and was intensifying cooperation with African and Asian leaders. In early 1961, Josip Broz Tito undertook a 72-day long 'journey of peace' (Bogetić, Dimić 2013: 95-108). While he sailed around the West African coast on his *Peace Ship Galeb*, a military uprising against the Portuguese rule broke out in Angola. Although during this journey no personal meetings with the Angolan representatives took place, available documents reveal that the situation in Angola was under the radar of the Yugoslav delegation. On 13 March 1961, a telegram from Belgrade arrived to *Galeb*, informing President Tito that the MPLA had sent a letter to the UN Secretary General and to all UN member states, stating that the question of Angola and other Portuguese colonies should be raised in the UN forums.<sup>7</sup> Yugoslav embassies in other African countries were immediately tasked with gathering information on the situation in Angola, since it was becoming an issue which surpassed Angolan borders (Čavoški forthcoming).

From the very outset there were two major liberation movements in Angola competing for internal and international recognition and support: the Union of Peoples of Angola (União dos Povos de Angola - UPA),<sup>8</sup> led by Holden Roberto, and the People's Movement of the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola - MPLA), headed first by Mário de Andrade and later by Agostinho Neto. In mid-1960s, Jonas Savimbi broke with the National Liberation Front of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola - FNLA) and established another important movement, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola - UNITA; Marcum 1969). However, the situation in Angola was far from simple and it put not only Yugoslavia but even other African countries and great powers in a serious dilemma: which movement to support and/or how to bring about their unity.

Yugoslavia based its assessment and political stance on several principles. General support for anti-colonial movements and their struggle was beyond question. However, due to the fragmented nature of the Angolan political scene, Yugoslavia initially decided not to favor either of the competing movements. A document from 1962 indicates that Yugoslavia provided "political and moral support for the liberation struggle of the Angolan people" without taking sides in the internal disputes among the liberation movements, and suggesting that they should find a way for achieving unity.<sup>9</sup> Further evidence from the Yugoslav sources imply that in the early 1960s Yugoslavia based its policy according to the assessments and stances of other African states, and from 1963 was in line with the decisions adopted by the newly established Organization of African Unity (OAU).<sup>10</sup> The OAU initially recognized Holden Roberto's Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile (Govêrno revolucionário de Angola no exílio - GRAE), albeit emphasizing the necessity for cooperation with the MPLA, which was going through a period of deep internal and international crisis. Yugoslavia acted accordingly. It maintained contacts with both movements, providing certain financial and humanitarian aid and a number of scholarships for Angolan students. As a 1964 report clearly stated, "we have to be aware of the decisions adopted by the OAU Committee" and therefore put the focus on cooperation with the FNLA.<sup>11</sup> Accordingly, between 1961 and 1964 more aid was provided to the FNLA, although contacts were maintained with both movements.<sup>12</sup> At the time, Yugoslavs were mostly concerned about the disunity among the liberation movements in Angola, which, in their opinion, weakened the effectiveness of the anti-colonial struggle. These concerns were reflected in the contemporary Yugoslav publications as well. One of them stated that "the unity of the movement is an urgent matter, since what the Angolan people need most is freedom" (Pešić 1964: 20).<sup>13</sup>

The balance started to change in 1964 when the MPLA was officially recognized by the OAU, which probably influenced Yugoslavia to grant more aid to this movement.<sup>14</sup> The information received in March 1965 that the OAU Conference recognized the MPLA as the only national force actively involved in the struggle against Portuguese colonialism proved crucial for Yugoslav attitude towards Angolan liberation movements. Yugoslavs initially reacted by instructing their diplomatic representatives in Africa to get thoroughly informed about the conclusions of the OAU Conference, about the attitudes of African governments towards both the FNLA and the MPLA, to consult with Algeria, Mali, Guinea, UAR, Tanzania, Kenya and other countries about the activities of the MPLA and simultaneously to give more publicity to the MPLA in the Yugoslav media.<sup>15</sup> From that point Yugoslavia diverted its help solely to the MPLA, providing larger amounts of aid, and in 1969 it started providing military assistance as well.<sup>16</sup> Until the end of the Angolan War of Liberation, Yugoslavia never diverted this political course and it continued supporting the MPLA's struggle, although not cutting all information sources about the FNLA.

### Establishing contacts and bridging differences

Internationalization of the Angolan struggle began in the early 1960s in Léopoldville and other African countries (Sobers 2014). Both Angolan liberation movements at the time had their headquarters in Léopoldville, and Congo was one of the first places where Angolan and Yugoslav representatives could directly meet. Already in April 1960, Holden Roberto told the Yugoslav representatives that he was advised by the Minister of Defense in the temporary government of Congo to visit Yugoslavia.<sup>17</sup> Even more important for spreading Yugoslavia's influence in Africa was Algeria, which was trying to posit itself as a bridge between countries like Yugoslavia or Cuba and sub-Saharan Africa (Byrne 2016: 174-175). Yugoslavia was also interested in Algeria's contacts with other African countries as it saw them as a potential gateway into Africa.<sup>18</sup> Apart from Algeria, contacts with both Angolan liberation movements were in this period maintained through Yugoslav embassies in Conakry, Leopoldville and Brazzaville (Čavoški forthcoming).<sup>19</sup>

The Angolan struggle was from the outset in the focus of Algerian policy. By the end of 1962, both the MPLA and the FNLA had asked for support and looked to Algeria for inspiration (Byrne 2016: 191). Members of both movements received military training in Algeria, and it became another place where Angolans could gain first-hand information about Yugoslav-Algerian relations.<sup>20</sup> Although Yugoslavs restrained from providing Angolan movements with weapons until late 1960s, already in 1963 they assisted Ben Bella in transporting military shipment to the Angolans (Byrne 2016: 204). There are many examples of mutually beneficial Yugoslav-Algerian cooperation (Byrne 2016, Milošević 2013), which were directly witnessed by the Angolans. Luís de Azavedo's statement, made in 1964 in Belgrade, that the vast moral, political and material aid Yugoslavia provided to Algeria was well known to them, and that he was certain that "the help you [Yugoslavs] will provide to Angola will be equally fruitful as it was to Algeria"<sup>21</sup> is, therefore, hardly surprising.

The contacts established between Yugoslavia and Angola during the 1960s were pioneering steps in mutual relations, just as was the case with most African countries (Radonjić 2016). In order to find common grounds with various Third World movements and countries, Yugoslav leaders were putting effort into presenting themselves as similar to them (Vučetić 2017: 25).<sup>22</sup> Most obvious similarities were found in the realm of political goals and principles, which proved to be a '*lingua franca*' in Yugoslav relations with the Third World. In the words of Alvin Z. Rubenstein, "he who can put forth in cogent and persuasive fashion ideas that seem to accord with the best interests of one's own country will be listened to, regardless of where he comes from or what is the actual strength of his country. Tito's ideas fell on receptive ears; he struck the right note with the right audience at the right moment in time" (Rubinstein 1970: 117).

Such propitious 'moment in time' was the First Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held in Belgrade in September 1961 (Carvalho 2014; Bogetić, Dimić 2013). Both the

UPA leader Holden Roberto and the MPLA leader Mário de Andrade attended the Conference in Belgrade, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) forums became one of the official channels for pursuing international recognition, alongside UN and later OAU. For the liberation movements and newly liberated states, non-alignment provided an alternative to exchanging a toppled colonial master with a new one and promised a way to achieving independence and political autonomy. Yugoslavia's prominent role in the NAM had made it one of the political role models. A part of the Final document adopted at the Belgrade conference was dedicated to the liberation struggle in Angola.<sup>23</sup> As a conference venue, already in 1961 Belgrade established itself as a place Angolans could turn to for support in achieving international recognition.<sup>24</sup>

Furthermore, as Byrne has noted, "Yugoslavia was a relatively powerful, industrialized partner that could assist the likes of Algeria, Egypt, and Ghana in their conception of the Third World project, without bringing its own conflicting agenda to bear as China and the Soviet Union did" (Byrne 2016: 204). The MPLA Central Committee member Albert Ludy stated later, in 1974, that "there are clearly three distinguished groups of countries in regard of the way they treat the MPLA: the western, the socialist and Yugoslavia". He added that Yugoslavia deserved this "special and privileged place", because the aid it provided came unconditioned.<sup>25</sup> On the one hand, Yugoslavia could only provide limited material assistance to the Angolan liberation movements, which threatened to jeopardize the fruitfulness of Yugoslav-Angolan cooperation. On the other hand, however, and partly due to the lack of resources, Yugoslavs restrained from pressuring and conditioning their allies, which made their assistance and advice more welcome, and their words and policy sound trustworthy. An episode brought about by Piero Gleijeses well illustrates how putting pressure on political allies could have had a counter-effect on them. To the surprise of those waiting for him in Belgrade in 1967, Agostinho Neto arrived by train instead of coming by plane as he was initially supposed to. Namely, Neto visited Beijing first, where the Chinese tried to persuade him to denounce the 'Soviet revisionism', which he refused and therefore remained without Chinese help. Thereafter, he visited Moscow, where the Soviets pressured him to denounce the Chinese. He reacted by cancelling the plane ticket bought for him by the Soviets and buying a train ticket to Belgrade, which he could afford himself (Gleijeses 2002: 242-243). Yugoslavs used such situations to underline their distinctiveness, and to turn their flaws into an advantage. In fact, an independent, self-conscious and nationally self-aware Angola, which would not succumb to pressures coming from any great power was in Yugoslav best interest. Such Angola would not only mean another vote in the UN General Assembly, or within the NAM, but even more importantly, it would serve the purpose of strengthening and reaffirming Yugoslav own foreign political position.

The feeling that the Yugoslav side understood the nature of the Angolan struggle derived out of the above-mentioned mutual interests, principles and of the unconditional nature

of Yugoslavia's help. It was both a *locus communis* during Yugoslav-Angolan talks and a peculiarity noted by the outside world. Basil Davidson stated in the foreword to the book *Africa in Transformation. Anti-Colonial and Social Revolution in the Former Portuguese Colonies*, written by the Yugoslav scholar and politician Ivan Iveković, that "the success in explaining such a complex matter can only derive from the ability and experiences of a man who precisely knew what 'national liberation' meant in his own life and to his people [...] by experiencing all that, they [the peoples of Yugoslavia] became increasingly competent for analyzing and explaining the nature and needs of other peoples – in this case the African ones – which face similar challenges, although in a different historical context" (Davidson 1984: 5-11).

### Sharing experiences

Those experiences which, according to Basil Davidson, helped Yugoslavs understand the circumstances, needs, and challenges faced by the Angolans, were only partially a reflection of historical realities. To a large extent, that image derived from the glorifying narrative of national liberation struggle that was developed in Yugoslavia, especially after the break with Stalin. Moreover, the Yugoslavs' self-representation of their history, experiences, culture and achievements aimed at constructing an image similar to and compatible with the needs of their Third World partners. As soon as 1961, the Angolans visiting Yugoslavia stated that they wished to learn from the Yugoslav experiences of national-liberation struggle and state building. But Yugoslavia was neither the only country asked to share experiences nor were the means employed by the Yugoslavs unique.<sup>26</sup> The praxis of granting scholarships, preparing cultural programs for delegations coming from abroad, or cooperation in the field of information was employed by others as well. During the Khrushchev era, the USSR got involved in African affairs with the primary goal of exporting a socialist model of development that would, in a peaceful competition, secure the Soviet Union victory over the West. In line with that aim, the newly independent Third World countries were presented with the benefits of the socialist model (Iandolo 2012).

However, notwithstanding the similarities in means and rhetoric, there were also considerable differences in the messages conveyed by Yugoslavia and other Eastern bloc countries. By highlighting its experiences, Yugoslavia was not only suggesting that it was different from other countries, but also, even more importantly, that being socialist yet non-aligned and cooperating with both East and West was not impossible. Yugoslavs were careful not to look as if they were imposing their model onto the Angolans. On the contrary, they supported national self-awareness of the Angolans and their tenacious efforts to remain sovereign. They therefore often advised the Angolans to "use the experiences of Yugoslav liberation struggle, of Algeria and Vietnam, but the solutions must be Angolan".<sup>27</sup> Whereas, for example, the GDR leader Erich Honecker underlined how beneficial cooperation with the USSR was for East German post-war

development, thereby suggesting Neto closer cooperation with Moscow,<sup>28</sup> Yugoslavs, albeit insisting on different paths to socialism, never pointed out the usefulness of learning from the Chinese, the Soviets or any other Eastern bloc country. Even when suggesting certain model – such as Algerian or Vietnamese – as useful, the main message was to remain independent and sovereign.

Directly or indirectly, Yugoslavs kept displaying the USSR as a potential threat to small countries' independence. However, after Stalin's death and the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU, the USSR significantly changed its rhetoric and praxis towards the Third World. In the realm of students' exchange, for example, the former Comintern praxis of cadre training was abandoned in favor of promoting a more integrative non-capitalist path to development, based on anti-imperialist sentiments and a promotion of Soviet socialist progress (Rupprecht 2015). This new Soviet strategy posed a challenge to Yugoslavia both in terms of presenting itself as distinct and against the backdrop of limited resources. Ideological and practical change in the USSR culminated in the establishment of the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow, which was followed by similar schools in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and China, and programs for international students' exchange in other socialist countries.

In the late 1950s, the Yugoslav leadership also formulated an all-encompassing program for funding scholarships for foreign students in Yugoslavia. Due to the 'second ideological conflict' with the USSR, which started in 1957, and the consequent cooling off of relations with the Eastern Bloc (Rajak 2013), many leading figures in Yugoslavia advocated the need to focus on students coming from African and Arab countries. Aware that "a battle for intelligentsia" had already started both in the East and the West, they urged that Belgrade enter the competition, since the students educated in Yugoslavia would be a lever for achieving economic, ideological and political influence in their home countries (Bondžić, 2011: 254-256). Same applied both to higher education and to military trainings. In 1971, Yugoslavia gave priority to training of 6 high ranking officers of the MPLA, who composed almost the whole headquarters of the First military zone in Angola and later earned even more important positions.<sup>29</sup> However, estimates from 1973 indicated that at that very moment ca. 150 fighters were receiving training in the USSR, around 200 in China, and that the MPLA needed 500-600 fighters undergoing military training on a monthly level.<sup>30</sup> Even if these figures are not entirely precise, they show that Angolan needs highly surpassed Yugoslav capacities. Furthermore, this example indicates that, due to limited financial means, Yugoslavs targeted members of the Angolan military elite, thus aiming to educate people who would be on high positions upon returning to Angola.<sup>31</sup> This practice further limited the scope of Yugoslavia's influence on the Angolan population, and in the mid-1970s they disappointedly assessed that "the majority of the MPLA members, except the leading circles, follow the experience and practice of East European countries".<sup>32</sup> According to the Yugoslavs, the Eastern bloc and China were able to establish political and



ideological influence on the middle-ranking party and army members, which resulted in "an uncritical acceptance of Soviet slogans, unadjusted propaganda, and insufficient knowledge of the experiences of other countries and of different paths to socialism" on part of the Angolan 'comrades'.<sup>33</sup>

There were also other means available for Yugoslavs to showcase their path to socialism and all the benefits of both their internal model and foreign political position. For each Angolan visit to Yugoslavia, whether it was an official delegation, a short stay, scholarship, or medical treatment, a special program was prepared, aimed at leaving a favorable impression on guests. However, this was a common practice not only in the case of Yugoslavia. Visitors from Africa to the USSR were being taken to Central Asia to witness the socialist transformation of the "Soviet Union's internal postcolonial space" (Burton 2017: 12). A Guinean delegation visiting the USSR was taken to the Muslim-populated SSR Azerbaijan to be presented how Guinea could be transformed if it adopted "Moscow's recipe for modernity" (Iandolo 2012: 603). Internal political and socio-economical model was thus being invoked to serve the purpose of fulfilling and legitimizing foreign political goals.

For the Angolans visiting Yugoslavia, programs usually contained a representation of Yugoslav war-time experience as well as of its 'reality', which sought to legitimize and support the image of a successful revolution. Yugoslav model of self-management socialism was portrayed as a guarantee for country's independence and as a compromise between East and West. Furthermore, which of the two abovementioned aspects was highlighted depended on the current Angolan needs. In the beginning, the war-time experience was in the spotlight; then, it was gradually replaced by economic, social and cultural experiences. The program usually included visits to museums, academic institutions, war-time locations, social organizations, as well as collectives and factories. These visits were enriched by talks about themes which interested the Angolans, be it war-time experiences or organization of party and state. Alongside all of that, there were screenings of Yugoslav films about its revolution, natural wealth, cultural heritage, and solidarity with other liberation movements.<sup>34</sup> Such 'cultural' program was intended to achieve a multilayered influence. The transfer of experiences on its own created cultural and political ties to Yugoslavia, it further spread Yugoslavia's popularity in Africa, and created another 'follower' to back Yugoslavia in its competition with other 'revolutionary exporters'. Museums and films dedicated to war both glorified the Yugoslav struggle and served as a beacon of its contemporary culture and art – the content suited the Angolan needs and interests, but the form showed successful modernization.

The visitors to Yugoslavia were oftentimes guided through various parts of the country in the effort to show Yugoslav freedom and its national, religious and cultural diversity. Yugoslavia represented its concept of 'brotherhood and unity' of all Yugoslav peoples as a way to resolve national, religious and cultural differences. The model of national

unity achieved by Yugoslavia was portrayed as suitable for solving the tribal, racial, and ideological problems of the Angolan society. This is well illustrated by a discussion during the visit of Henrique Carreira to Yugoslavia in 1970. While talking about the religiously and nationally heterogeneous Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslav general Džemal Šarac stated that "national liberation struggle arose as a force of national reconciliation. Without brotherhood and unity there would be no Yugoslavia". Carreira added that they "experienced same problems" and that they realized "that only through struggle a national identity could be established".<sup>35</sup>

In order to make Yugoslav experiences legitimate and applicable to Angolan circumstances, commonalities in their pasts also had to be found, or invented. Once again, Yugoslavia was not the only one resorting to such strategy. Africanists in the USSR also undertook selective framing of Soviet history, thereby underlining that the Soviet Union had been facing and successfully overcoming similar problems to those that the postcolonial states were facing in those days (Burton 2017: 11-12), while the Chinese press presented the Angolan struggle as similar to the Chinese communist revolution (Jackson 1995: 392). Likewise, Yugoslavs drew parallels between the current situation in Angola and the Yugoslav war-time, as there was a foreign fascist occupier and two conflicting liberation movements, a communist and a nationalist one. This resemblance was further emphasized by a similarity in the goals of the Yugoslav partisans and the MPLA – national liberation and socialist revolution. Moreover, Yugoslavia regarded the regime in Portugal as fascist, which encouraged drawing parallels between anti-fascist struggle in Yugoslavia and war against Portuguese colonialism in Angola. Yugoslav leaders often viewed the situation in Angola through the lenses of their own experience, which strengthened the similarities and the feeling of comradeship. They repeatedly stated that they understood the Angolan struggle because Yugoslavia itself was founded in an arduous struggle for independence.<sup>36</sup>

Although Yugoslavia was the 'older partner' in Yugoslav-Angolan relations, the one who shared its experiences, it neither had the perspective nor the approach of a dominant power. Yugoslavia almost exclusively presented itself (i.e. the Communist Party) as a victim of the 'fascist' rule in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, as well as of the fascist and imperialist occupation during the Second World War, and, afterwards, as a victim of imperialist ambitions of a great power, i.e. the Soviet Union after 1948. Yugoslavia presented itself not as a dominant, but as an equal partner, who was merely more experienced due to the successful victory against a stronger opponent in war and revolution. Out of such construction of their own pasts and experiences, the feeling of mutual solidarity and understanding arose. Angolan representatives also recognized these parallels, stating that they "need the help of those who fight or have fought similar battles as they do".<sup>37</sup>

## Reaping the benefits and exercising influence

The efforts invested in forming an appealing image of Yugoslavia slowly started to pay off. During his visit to Yugoslavia in January 1968 Agostinho Neto stated that the MPLA was getting closer to countries like Yugoslavia and that they aimed to follow the Yugoslav example in order to avoid mistakes made by other African countries.<sup>38</sup> The Angolan delegation also sought Yugoslav opinion on various international and internal issues, thereby expressing the wish to exchange opinions more often since they strove for a "correct" understanding of these matters and for obtaining "objective" information and analyses.<sup>39</sup>

Agostinho Neto visited Yugoslavia once again during the same year. This time, in October 1968, Neto was received by Tito for the first time, although he had voiced the wish to meet with the Yugoslav president on multiple previous occasions. In the autumn of 1968, however, Neto arrived in Yugoslavia despite severe tensions between Belgrade and Moscow following the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. By doing so, he became an autonomous political figure in the eyes of the Yugoslav President. While discussing the fighting in Angola, Tito pointed out that "freedom achieved single-handedly is most precious, and therefore most cherished", thereby reminding Neto of "the decisive struggle of the Yugoslav peoples for their own freedom and independence both during the war and after it".<sup>40</sup> These words were a clear reference to the victory in the WWII and to the break with the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries in 1948. Tito pointed out the "dangers which the new Soviet doctrine of limited sovereignty posed to all small countries regardless of their internal system", thereby strengthening the image of the Soviet Union as a threat to small countries' independence.<sup>41</sup> Neto concurred with Tito that small countries should decisively resist the attempts of great powers to limit their sovereignty and drag them into their own spheres of interest, although making no explicit comment on the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.<sup>42</sup> The same year the OAU decided to withdraw its support for the GRAE. This fact strengthened MPLA's international standing and, together with Neto's visit to Yugoslavia, probably, influenced the Yugoslav decision to send the first shipments of military assistance to the MPLA.

Cooperation was developing in other fields as well. Yugoslavia's developed network of contacts with all sides involved in the global conflict as well as its dynamic political activity made it an appealing diplomatic and information base for the MPLA during the liberation struggle and in its aftermath. Yugoslavia was many times asked to mediate between the MPLA and various other movements or governments. Yugoslavs also helped the MPLA establish ties with several West European social democratic parties.<sup>43</sup> These ties were of multilayered significance to the MPLA: they were aimed at altering western public opinion towards the Portuguese colonialism, especially in those countries cooperating with Lisbon; they could contribute to outplay the competing liberation movements on the international scene; and they could change the image of

the MPLA as a pro-Soviet movement.

Neto established contacts with Scandinavian parties on his own, but getting in touch with the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) was achieved through Yugoslav mediation. During his visit to Yugoslavia, Neto asked his hosts to help him establish contacts with the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the second largest political party in a country which was one of Portugal's main suppliers. The Angolans wanted the contacts to be official and public, in order to serve the purpose of isolating Lisbon, and this condition was conveyed by the Yugoslav side to the SPD delegation visiting Yugoslavia in 1970.<sup>44</sup> Neto visited Bonn in early 1971 and was followed by Jose Condesse, head of the MPLA Information Center in Belgrade. Furthermore, the first ties with the British Labour Party were established in August 1971 during its delegation's visit to Yugoslavia, when the MPLA was invited to attend the forthcoming Labour Party Conference in the observer status.<sup>45</sup> Yugoslavia wholeheartedly supported MPLA's contacts with the West, as an opportunity to drag it out of the embrace of the socialist block, thereby nearing it to its own position. In addition, it served the purpose of raising the international prestige of Yugoslavia, which aimed at establishing itself as a mediator between East, West and the non-aligned world.

In the field of cultural cooperation, Yugoslavs started reaping the benefits as well. In 1970, the MPLA for the first time requested a shipment of synchronized Yugoslav films, naming the film *The Battle of Kozara*<sup>46</sup> as an example already familiar to them. Film was an important element of Yugoslav cultural diplomacy (Vučetić 2017). It was deemed "a very suitable tool of Yugoslav cultural propaganda in Africa", and the "most suitable medium for cultural cooperation and spreading cultural, ideological and propaganda influences".<sup>47</sup> The abovementioned request from 1970 was fulfilled. Yugoslavia prepared featured and short documentary and educational films about various topics, including Second World War in Yugoslavia, visits of African students to Yugoslavia, Yugoslav post-war history, the building of the 'New Belgrade neighborhood', the solidarity with Vietnam, the building of a power plant in Zambia. Those movies were supposed to be screened across the Angolan liberated territories, in the refugee camps, and guerilla bases. Yugoslavs thought that in this way the Yugoslav culture could gain a foothold in Angola.<sup>48</sup>

However, the cooperation in the field of information was even more successful than the cultural one. In 1970, the MPLA established its Information center in Belgrade. It was the first Information center of the MPLA outside Africa, despite the offers from both Cuba and Bulgaria. This center simultaneously served diplomatic, informative and propaganda purposes.<sup>49</sup> Upon its opening, a radio connection between Belgrade and the MPLA political base in Zambia was established. The radio connection with Belgrade was described as the MPLA's 'window to the world', and an opportunity to inform the world about their perspective on the Angolan conflict. On the other hand, Yugoslav news agency TANJUG wired its news to Zambia, out of which the MPLA created a

bulletin 'TANJUG news' which was distributed to the military zones and the liberated territories. In the words of Daniel Chipenda in 1972, "for such a thing they [Angolans] cannot seek help neither from the Russians nor from anyone else but Yugoslavia".<sup>50</sup> As a non-bloc country, Yugoslavia was probably better suited for this role than any other ally of the MPLA.<sup>51</sup> At the same time, this was a way for Yugoslavia to reach the Angolan population. Cooperation and activities in this field were in line with wider policies pursued and supported by Yugoslavia in the NAM forums.

At the beginning of the 1970s, a significant initiative took place among non-aligned countries which resulted in the founding of the Non-Aligned News Agencies Pool in 1976 (Bogetić, Bogetić 1981: 105-107; Berec 2015: 226-232).<sup>52</sup> TANJUG carried a key role not only in organizing the Pool but also in providing technical and educational support to the news agencies of the Third World countries. The global ambitions of the Pool were analogue to the global conceptions of non-alignment. As Yugoslav journalist Pero Ivačić stated in the *Unesco Courier* in 1977, "current efforts to build a new international economic order inevitably stimulated initiatives for change in the structure of information, which for decades had been based on a one-way flow of news from the developed to the developing countries under the influence of a small number of news agency giants in the developed world".<sup>53</sup> In other words, the initiatives taking place within the NAM had the final goal of 'decolonizing information'.

Yugoslavia provided scholarships for journalists of non-aligned countries in order to "create preconditions for new relations in this field [field of information]" and help "the truth about the non-aligned countries come from their own sources".<sup>54</sup> Technical support provided to the MPLA, as well as scholarships for Angolan diplomats in Belgrade in 1976 and talks about further training of Angolan journalists in Yugoslavia, should be analyzed in context of these political aims. Angolan Prime Minister asked a Yugoslav delegation in November 1976 to take the training of 30 Angolan journalists into consideration, in the manner of the previous "successful" training of diplomats.<sup>55</sup> In January 1978, the first Angolan Ambassador to Belgrade, Filip Martinez, also underlined the 'successfulness' of that training. He claimed that most diplomats educated in Yugoslavia occupied important positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the ruling party, and in the military. More importantly, in his words, their stay in Yugoslavia did not provide them merely with the diplomatic experience. They also acquired "such political knowledge, that in the recent crisis none of them became a traitor but they all stood with our President and our Revolution".<sup>56</sup>

The crisis to which Ambassador Martinez referred was a failed attempt to overthrow Neto in 1977, perpetrated by a high MPLA representative, Nito Alves.<sup>57</sup> He was a staunch supporter of the USSR, which sparked suspicion about Soviet interference in the plot, especially in the Western media. Although there has been no clear evidence of Soviet involvement, and Moscow continued to provide the MPLA with arms supplies and other means of aid,<sup>58</sup> Neto had no doubts about Soviet support for Nito Alves. Even before the

coup d'état, in early 1977, the Angolan leadership contacted the Yugoslav Embassy in Luanda, asking for help in revealing the plot of Nito Alves. Yugoslav officials interpreted this as a sign of "great trust in the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] and Yugoslavia".<sup>59</sup> The same document reported on deterioration in relations between the USSR and the MPLA leadership, and on the possibilities of broadening the cooperation between Luanda and the West, or even China.<sup>60</sup> Yugoslav ambassador reported from Luanda that recent events in Angola "reminded of what we were facing in 1948" and that Yugoslav support would be of significant importance for Neto at the moment.<sup>61</sup> The following month, in the midst of severe internal crisis, strained relations with the USSR, and intensive external pressures, an official Angolan delegation led by Agostinho Neto visited Yugoslavia. In a precarious situation, as it was in the first half of 1977, when trustworthiness of all partners, including Cuba and the USSR, seemed doubtful, Neto turned to Belgrade.

### **Obstacles, failures, and limits of Yugoslavia's policy**

In his work on Soviet policy towards Southern Africa Vladimir Shubin pointed out that "Neto always behaved independently from Moscow", and "preferred to receive assistance from Yugoslavia, led by Tito, which he regarded as independent, as well as Marxist-Leninist" (Shubin 2008: 27). However, Neto himself underlined, while praising the continuity of Yugoslav support for Angola, that "political support was insufficient if it was not followed by adequate economic measures".<sup>62</sup> The dichotomy between the successes of the political and diplomatic cooperation and the obstacles in other fields became a hallmark of Yugoslav-Angolan ties in the second half of the 1970s. Reasons that hindered broader cooperation were multiple and highly complex in nature. On the one hand, Yugoslav approach had many organizational and institutional flaws; on the other hand, the escalation of the Angolan crisis made arms supplies and economic assistance MPLA's top priority. Internationally, Yugoslavia was struggling to promote its own conception of non-alignment against Cuba, which could leverage its military support for the MPLA to achieve political gains.

Many sources from Yugoslav archives indicate that Yugoslavia's approach was neither sufficiently systematic nor institutionally organized.<sup>63</sup> Yugoslavs concluded that insufficient economic and cultural cooperation with Angola derived from "an unsynchronized approach of Yugoslav companies and the uncompetitive nature of its economy".<sup>64</sup> Although many shortcomings of Yugoslavia's policy in Africa were well known already during the 1960s,<sup>65</sup> little progress was made in the following decade, and even the Angolan representatives complained in private discussions about an unfair treatment, and the fact that Yugoslavia sometimes offered worse conditions for cooperation "than the capitalist West".<sup>66</sup> These insights remind once again of the mutually conditioning relation between foreign and domestic policies, and raise the question of the extent to which internal fault lines, institutional changes, and the federalization

of state influenced Yugoslavia's foreign political efficiency. Furthermore, its internal economic difficulties necessitated rationalization of foreign political expenditures. A Yugoslav report from 1976 concluded that "in order to secure mutual interests and conditions for long-term cooperation it is necessary to make a realistic and transparent analysis of further cooperation and aid". However, the Angolan society was still in dire need for help. In addition to that, in the late 1970s Angolan export to Yugoslavia made only 20% of the total amount of trade exchange between the two countries, which made the cooperation in this field quite imbalanced.<sup>67</sup> In order to balance trade with Angola, Yugoslavs continuously asked for Angola to export oil. However, it was not until 1980s that Yugoslavia started importing oil from Angola.<sup>68</sup> Faced with the fact that Yugoslavia's economic capacities could not meet the requirements of its foreign policy, the Yugoslav leadership was torn between the need to commercialize the country's economic cooperation with the Third World and the imperatives of solidarity and assistance for the less developed allies.

Another key obstacle for a more fruitful cooperation between Angola and Yugoslavia laid in the fact that the Angolan society did not enter a phase of peaceful development after gaining independence. In July 1975, the US President Ford approved US\$ 6 million, and a couple of days later an additional US\$ 8 million, for the covert operation in Angola (Telepneva 2014: 252). The conflict escalated further with South African troops crossing the Angolan border as well as with Cuban forces arriving from across the ocean. During the same year, Yugoslavia provided Neto with US\$ 1.7 million, and the US assessments were right to assume that Belgrade was not the MPLA's "chief backer".<sup>69</sup> The USSR and other East European countries began sending military aid which vastly surpassed those of Yugoslavia. The MPLA did attempt to secure greater amounts of armaments from Belgrade, and in 1976 the Angolan Prime Minister, Lopo do Nascimento, visited Yugoslavia in order to negotiate credits for military supplies. He underscored that the question of arms supplies was a highly political one, and that securing armaments from great powers run the risk of getting under their political pressure.<sup>70</sup> Yugoslavs, however, knew that the MPLA would not manage to stay in power and confront the competing Angolan forces backed by the US, China and South Africa without Soviet and Cuban military assistance. Therefore, they could not demand that Angolans break all ties with the Eastern bloc. During his conversations with Lopo do Nascimento, Tito claimed that it was possible to cooperate with both the USSR and Yugoslavia. He stated that this was the case in many African countries.<sup>71</sup> Internally, however, Yugoslavs were deeply convinced that the USSR aimed to divide non-aligned countries in order to drag them into their own sphere of influence.<sup>72</sup>

This issue became salient in the eve of the NAM Summit in Havana in 1979 (Jakovina 2010, 105-135). Namely, in the second half of the 1970s, two groups of NAM countries crystallized: a 'radical one' led by Castro, who proposed a "natural alliance" between non-alignment and socialism; and a 'moderate group', that insisted on original

principles of non-alignment represented by Tito. Yugoslavs feared that close Soviet-Cuban ties and radicals' insistence on socialist orientation of NAM members would ultimately destroy NAM's non-aligned, anti-bloc and anti-Cold-War essence. They assessed that Angola was insufficiently active in the OAU and that its cooperation with African countries was on an unsatisfactory level, due to its focus on cooperation with the USSR and Eastern bloc. Yugoslavs further concluded that Angolan understanding of non-alignment was limited by Soviet influences, as it was manifest in their simplified equating of non-alignment with anti-colonial struggle and socialism.<sup>73</sup> Several meetings with the Angolans served the purpose of reiterating Yugoslav view on the necessity of solidarity and unity among non-aligned states, regardless of their social or political order.<sup>74</sup> This was especially the case of the 1977 Neto's visit to Yugoslavia, and of the visit of Vidoje Žarković to Angola in 1978 as a personal deputy of Josip Broz Tito. In conversations with Žarković, Neto concurred with the Yugoslav conception of non-alignment. He emphasized that, unlike Cuba, which was dependent on Soviet assistance, Yugoslavia was a truly independent country, and independence was the foremost aim of the Angolan leadership as well.<sup>75</sup> Indeed, Yugoslavs considered Neto to be the guardian of the Angolan non-aligned and independent path, but at the same time their diplomats assessed that Angolan policy was highly dependent on "foreign factors" which "disapprove of the Yugoslav presence in Angola".<sup>76</sup> Yugoslavs assessed that the USSR, Cuba, and other East European countries were present in all aspects of the newly liberated Angolan society,<sup>77</sup> whereas Yugoslavia managed to build ties only with Angolan leadership, rather than with the middle ranking officials and the Angolan population. This resulted in the fact that after Agostinho Neto and Josip Broz Tito died, in 1979 and 1980 respectively, the most fruitful phase of Yugoslav-Angolan cooperation slowly came to an end.

## Conclusion

In 1977 Yugoslavia became the first socialist state Angola accredited its ambassador to, despite Soviet disapproval. It was a public and symbolic demonstration of their wish to pursue independent and non-aligned foreign policy.<sup>78</sup> At about the same time, a group of railway workers undergoing training in Yugoslavia urged the authorities to return to Angola, stating that "we can afford good life here, but we are wasting our time", and adding that they heard that instructors in the field from Cuba and the USSR had already arrived in Angola.<sup>79</sup> This dichotomy between Yugoslavia's high political standing and reputation, on the one hand, and the difficulties when it came to practical cooperation, on the other hand, was oftentimes the case in Yugoslav-Angolan relations, especially after Angola gained independence.

A Yugoslav assessment from 1976 indicated that "the high expectations of the Angolans could have led to misunderstandings and disappointment".<sup>80</sup> However, these 'high expectations' had been fueled by the Yugoslav side over the previous



years. They tried and succeeded in conveying a favorable image of Yugoslavia to their Angolan counterparts. Political principles were presented and accepted as legitimate, revolutionary, war-time and post-war experiences as applicable, and current 'reality' and international standing as exemplary of the righteousness of their independent path. All these components were transferred during mutual visits, in the international forums, through scholarships, films, and cooperation in the fields of education and information. Providing unconditioned material and military aid made political declarations seem trustworthy. In this way, Yugoslavia managed to translate its foreign political image into political gains: it earned the opportunity to become a political advisor to the Angolan leadership and in a way also a foreign political role model; it was asked to mediate between the MPLA and western social democrats; and it became the place where the Information Center of the MPLA was established and the first European capital where an Angolan Embassy was opened. However symbolic, these acts corroborated the image and standing Yugoslavia had.

All of this made Agostinho Neto conclude in 1978 that "in order to be truly non-aligned, a country had to be independent first" – "now, we are entirely independent, as we managed to establish diverse international ties, to resist all foreign pressures and to secure the authenticity of our revolution [...] now, we can pursue the same policy as Yugoslavia does within the non-aligned movement, and that is the only right path".<sup>81</sup> Such image of Yugoslavia persisted, but faded away against the backdrop of the escalation of Angolan conflict, major military and material backing provided by the USSR and the presence of Cuban troops. It was difficult, if not impossible, to dissuade and confront Lucio Lara's argument about the fundamental differences between the two blocs, when Angolans witnessed Cuban soldiers "shedding their blood in Angola in the name of proletarian internationalism!".<sup>82</sup> Limited resources confined Yugoslavia's political and ideological reach among Angolan officials and population to a small group of leading personalities. Piero Gleijeses rightly concluded that "probably, Neto would have felt most comfortable with Yugoslavia – a country that kept the Soviet Union at arm's length – but Yugoslavia could not help him, not enough" (Gleijeses 2002: 77). Although Yugoslavia successfully conveyed a favorable image of itself to the Angolans, when the crisis in Angola escalated, Yugoslavia was not able to meet the Angolan needs.

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## NOTES:

1 - For more on the Angolan War of Independence, see Marcum (1969, 1978). For more information on foreign assistance and intervention in Angola, and Southern Africa in general, see Gleijeses (2002), Westad (2005), Shubin (2008), and Telepneva (2014).

2 - Yugoslavia managed to play a significant role in the Angolan struggle, despite its limited capacities. Nevertheless, until recently, this topic has remained out of historians' spotlight. A significant contribution has been made by Jovan Čavoški, who underlined the importance of Yugoslavia's political and military support to the MPLA's rise to power (Čavoški forthcoming). Odd Arne Westad has also noted that in Angola and Algeria Yugoslavia, and not the USSR, was the chief political advisor. See: Odd Arne Westad, *Beograd budio Treći svet*, "Večernje novosti online", 26 May 2012: <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/politika/aktuelno.289.html:381507-Arne-Vestad-Beograd-budio-treci-svet>. Furthermore, Jorge Santos Carvalho also devoted attention to the Yugoslav-Angolan relations in the context of his research on Yugoslav-Portuguese relations after the Second World War: Carvalho (2011).

3 - There is a large body of literature on the Yugoslavia's foreign policy during 1950s. For a comprehensive overview, see Bekić (1988) and Dimić (2003). On the roots of Yugoslavia's non-aligned foreign political orientation, see: Bogetić (1990). For a succinct overview, see Životić and Čavoški (2016) and Rubinstein (1970).

4 - Archives of Yugoslavia (AJ), Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (507), Commission for international relations and ties (IX), s/a-6, *Notes on our cooperation with socialist parties, democratic organizations and national-liberation movements in the world*, September 1952.

5 - For an analysis of how foreign political successes were used for internal stability and legitimization of the Yugoslav regime see Niebuhr (2011).

6 - AJ, 507/IX, 3/I-1-46-95, *Transcripts of talks between Babic Dimitrije and Maria Eugénia Neto*, 7 April 1976.

7 - AJ, President of the Republic's Office (837), I-5-b/3-1, *Angola*.

8 - The liberation movement led by Holden Roberto had several names. Some of these versions co-existed. It was first founded as the Union of Peoples of Northern Angola (União dos Povos do Norte de Angola - UPNA), changed its name into the Union of Peoples of Angola (União dos Povos de Angola - UPA), and in 1961 merged into the National Liberation Front of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola - FNLA). In the Yugoslav documents it is sometimes referred to as UPA/FNLA. In 1962 the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (Governo revolucionário de Angola no exílio - GRAE) was founded, led by the FNLA.

9 - AJ, 507/IX, 3/III-1-17, *Information on Angola*, 1962.

10 - Official recognition by the Liberation Committee of the OAU meant that the financial, material and military assistance of several donor-countries, as well as an access to the conference rooms of the OAU and the UN, became available to the recognized movement. The UN only recognized movements supported by the OAU, which made it a legitimizing force for the liberation movements. Only the FNLA and later the MPLA were officially recognized by the OAU during the liberation struggle (Sobers 2014).

11 - AJ, Socialist alliance of the working people of Yugoslavia - SSRNJ (142), I 553, *Reminder for Holden Roberto's visit to Yugoslavia*, 1964.

12 - According to Yugoslav estimate from 1964, in 1963 Yugoslavia provided US\$ 3,000 to FNLA and US\$ 1,500 to MPLA, both movements received humanitarian assistance, and 6 FNLA and 3 MPLA students were undergoing practical training in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavs decided to continue providing humanitarian and material assistance to Angolan liberation movements, but to restrain from sending armaments, "since African countries and liberation movements should deal with and decide upon these issues". See: AJ, 142, I 553, *Reminder for Holden Roberto's visit to Yugoslavia*, 1964.

13 - Yugoslav publications dealing with the Angolan anti-colonial struggle published in the period 1961-1964 reflect Yugoslavia's policy towards liberation movements. Both the MPLA and the UPA/FNLA are mentioned, although more space is given to Holden Roberto's movement. A hope that the two movements would find a common language and unite against the Portuguese was underlined in each of them. See: Avramović (1962) and Pešić (1964).

14 - According to Yugoslav sources, in 1964 MPLA was provided US\$ 3,500 and material aid worth 4 million Yugoslav dinars, whereas FNLA received US\$ 2,000 and 2 million Yugoslav dinars worth material aid. The PAIGC of Guinea Bissau received the same amount of assistance as the FNLA, Mozambican FRELIMO was granted US\$ 2,000, UDENAMO US\$ 100, and US\$ 500 were provided for organizing the CONCP conference. AJ, 142, I-539, *Cooperation between SSRNJ and liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies*, 1965.

15 - AJ, 142, I 553, *The Angolan Movement after the Conference in Nairobi*, 27 March 1965.

- 16 - For a detailed account of military and material assistance Yugoslavia provided to Angolan liberation movements, see Čavoški (forthcoming).
- 17 - AJ, 507, IX, 3/II-1-12, Note about a conversation with Gilmore, 10 April 1960
- 18 - As Algerian ambassador to Belgrade Rédha Malek noted, "through their good relations with us, the Yugoslavians would like to strengthen their own cooperation with African and Arab countries. For this reason, they are especially interested in Algeria developing a close rapport with African countries south of the Sahara" (Byrne 2016: 204).
- 19 - Both the MPLA and the UPA/FNLA initially had their headquarters in Leopoldville. MPLA soon moved to Conakry but returned in the mid-1962. After the OAU recognized only the FNLA as Angolan liberation movement, the MPLA was forced to leave Leopoldville, and therefore moved its headquarters to Brazzaville in November 1963.
- 20 - Yugoslavia also maintained ties with the Portuguese National Liberation Front (FPLN) via Algeria. Although the first contacts were established in 1962 when Mário Ruivo arrived in Belgrade from Italy, after the FPLN representatives Tito de Morais and Ferdinando Piteira Santos approached Yugoslav Embassy in Algeria in 1963, Algeria became the main place for getting in touch with the Portuguese opposition during the 1960s. See AJ, 507, IX, 103/II-1, *Talks between M. Gabričević and the FPLN representatives in Algeria*, 27 March 1963; AJ, 507, IX, 103/II-14, *Cooperation between SSRNJ and the FPLN*, 1965. See also Jorge Santos Carvalho, *As Relações Jugoslavo-Portuguesas (1961-71) nos arquivos de Belgrado*, Cadernos do CEIS20, 17, Coimbra 2011, 9-15.
- 21 - AJ 507, IX, 3/II-1-46-95, *Talks Dobrivoje Vidić - Luis Azavedo*, 18 February 1964
- 22 - As Radina Vučetić pointed out in her article on representations of power during Tito's African journeys, although the main visual impression after looking at numerous photographs of Tito's visits to Africa is the image of a 'white man' to a 'black land', 'white' and 'black' were mentioned only in view of highlighting their equality, similarity, cooperation, and mutual (socialist) ideals.
- 23 - Article No 4 of the final Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries adopted at the Belgrade conference in September 1961 was dedicated to Angola. The document warned about the situation in the country, condemned Portuguese colonial rule, and called for "all the peace-loving countries" and especially members of the OUN to help the Angolan people achieve freedom and independence.
- 24 - The Portuguese FPLN also asked Yugoslavia to help their delegation attend the next conference of non-aligned countries as observers, since it would help them internationalize their struggle, broaden contacts and increase international prestige. Yugoslavia denied this plea, explaining that only anti-colonial movements can attend the conference. AJ, 507, IX, 103/II-5, *Informaton about the visit od a FPLN delegation to Yugoslavia*, 28 May-5 June 1964.
- 25 - AJ, 507, IX, 3/II-1-46-95, *Information about the MPLA's visit*, 28 May 1974
- 26 - For example, a MPLA delegation visiting Czechoslovakia in January 1961 also stated that their aim was to learn from Czechoslovak experiences (Muehlenbeck 2016: 107).
- 27 - AJ, 142, I 553, *Note on the visit of Henriqe Carreira to general mayor Džemal Šarac*, 29 September 1970.
- 28 - Foundation Parties and Mass Organizations of the GDR in the Federal Archives (SAPMO-BArch), Socialist Unity Party of Germany (DY 30), 2422, Notes on official conversation between Erich Honecker and Agostinho Neto in Luanda, 17 February 1979.
- 29 - According to Yugoslav documents, one of them became a minister in the Provisional Government of Angola, another became the commander of the whole military zone. AJ, 143, I 554, *Assistance for the MPLA in 1971. Proposals*.
- 30 - AJ, 142, I 554, *Notes on conversations between M. Stevović and Iko Carreira*, 7 November 1973.
- 31 - AJ, 142, I 554, *Visit of the MPLA military commanders*; AJ, 142, I 554, *The report about the military training of Comsales Domingos in Yugoslavia*, 5 May 1975; AJ, 142, I 554, *Talks M. Stevović - Iko Carreira*, 11 November 1973.
- 32 - AJ, 507, IX, 3/II-1-46-95, *Report about the visit of the LCY delegation to Angola for the 20th anniversary of the MPLA*.
- 33 - AJ, 507, IX, 3/II-1-46-95, *Visit of the LCY delegation to Angola, the 20th anniversary of the MPLA*.
- 34 - AJ, 507, IX, 3/II-1-46-95, *The visit of Benedito Gonclaves to Yugoslavia*, March 1963; AJ, 507, IX, 3/II-1-12, *The schedule for the Jose Gilmore's stay*, 1961; AJ, 507, IX, 3/II-1-46-95, *The schedule for the Mario Andrade's stay in Yugoslavia*.
- 35 - AJ, 142, I 553, *Report on the visit of H. Carreira to Yugoslavia*, 1970.

- 36 - See for example: AJ, 142, A 011, *Report about the talks between a Yugoslav delegation and the members of the Provisional Government of Angola*, 3 February 1975.
- 37 - AJ, 142, I 553, *Transcripts of talks between H. Carreira and general Šarac*, 28 September 1970.
- 38 - AJ, 142, I 553, *MPLA's visit to Yugoslavia*, 18-25 January 1968.
- 39 - *Ibid.*
- 40 - AJ, 837, I-3-a/3-2, *Visit of Agostinho Neto*, 29 October 1968.
- 41 - *Ibid.*
- 42 - *Ibid.*
- 43 - AJ, 142, I 554, *Information on the assistance SFRY provided to the MPLA*, February 1970.
- 44 - AJ, 142, I 554, *Note on the MPLA request for Yugoslav mediation with the SPD*, 27 November 1970.
- 45 - AJ, 142, I 554, *Report on the MPLA and cooperation between SSRNJ and MPLA in 1971*, December 1971.
- 46 - *The Battle of Kozara* is a 1962 Yugoslav partisan film which depicts events surrounding the Battle of Kozara fought in 1942. This film was screened on several occasions during the visits of various Angolan representatives to Yugoslavia in 1960s, but they might have also seen it elsewhere in Africa, as it was exported to multiple African countries and film festivals.
- 47 - AJ, Federal commission for cultural relations (559), The film committee. At the moment of author's research, the documents of the Film Committee were being reclassified. The author was allowed an insight into the fond by the archivist in charge, but the documents were unsigned. The film committee was established in 1961. Already at the first meeting it was decided to intensify Yugoslav film propaganda in Africa and Asia in order to make Yugoslav film popular in these regions. See Vučetić (2017).
- 48 - AJ, 142, I 553, *Requests of the MPLA*, 15 February 1970; AJ, 142, I 554, *The reply of the Federal Secretary of Information SSRNJ regarding the films for the MPLA*.
- 49 - The MPLA Informaton Center in Belgrade was dissolved upon the opening of the Angolan Embassy in Yugoslavia, which overtook its prerogatives.
- 50 - AJ, 142, I 554, *Talks D. J. Chipenda – Boža Rafajlović*, 3 August 1971.
- 51 - Similarly, Radina Vučetić underlines that it was Yugoslavia's non-bloc position which made Yugoslav reporters and filmmakers suitable for cooperation with the FRELIMO and for recording the liberation struggle in Mozambique. This is corroborated by the words of Eduardo Modlane that the fact that a film reporter from Yugoslavia was the first to be allowed to document the Mozambican struggle was by no means a coincidence, since "a film made by the Yugoslavs was more effective than by a reporter of any other nationality". See Vučetić (2017).
- 52 - Recommendations regarding the cooperation in the field of information were adopted at the 4th Summit Conference in Algiers in 1973. The Non-Aligned News Agencies Pool was constituted at the Meeting of ministers of information and news agencies directors of 62 non-aligned countries in July 1976 in New Delhi. A month later all conclusions were endorsed at the Non-aligned Summit in Colombo. At the beginning, Yugoslav news agency Tanjug had a leading role in organizing and promoting the activities of the Pool.
- 53 - Pero Ivačić, *The non-aligned countries pool their news*, "A Selection from the Unesco Courier: A 40th Anniversary Issue", May-June 1986: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0006/000694/069416eo.pdf>.
- 54 - AJ, Federal committee for education and culture (320), 49, *Conclusions about the education of journalists from the non-aligned countries in SFRY*.
- 55 - AJ, 142, A 011, *Meeting between the SSRJ delegation and Lopo do Nascimento*, 20 November 1976.
- 56 - AJ, 142, A 012, *Information on the attendees of the special course about diplomatic relations*, January, 1978.
- 57 - For more information on the contested events and massacres following the coup d'etat, see one of the first book in English covering those events: Pawson (2014). For more details on Nito Alves and the coup itself, see Fauvet (1977).
- 58 - During his visit to the USSR in August 1977, Neto allegedly asked Leonid Brezhnev if Soviet Union was anyhow involved in the coup d'état against him. At first, Brezhnev was confused, but he later denied any Soviet interference. The USSR continued to assist the MPLA, and even in his speech at the first Congress of the MPLA, Neto addressed this issue, stating that Moscow had been a loyal partner of the MPLA (Shubin, Tokarev 2001). According to Piero Gleijeses, "until more evidence surfaces" the most persuasive explanation is that some Soviet officials in Angola, encouraged by Soviet distrust of Neto, knew about the plot and welcomed it, while others remained neutral (2013: 76).

59 - AJ, 507, IX, 3/III-16, *Recent development of Soviet-Angolan relations and proposals for our further steps*, March 15 1977.

60 - *Ibid.*

61 - AJ, 837, I-5-b/3-4, *Reasons of the attempted putsch in Angola*, 1977

62 - Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (DA MSP RS), Political Archive (PA), 1977, 14, 3, 425314, *Conversations with an Angolan delegation held in the Presidency of the FR Serbia*, 23 April 1977.

63 - Yugoslav sources mention many examples of uncoordinated and disorganized cooperation. For example, in 1977 the Angolans complained to the Yugoslav ambassador Šašić about the delay in sending equipment for the Institute of foreign languages. They conveyed that many Angolans wondered why they decided to cooperate with the Yugoslavs regarding the equipment, since they proved to be ineffective and slow (DA MSP RS, PA, 1977, 14, 6, 470218). The Angolan Minister of transport complained about the conditions offered by the Goša factory and especially about the prices (DA MSP RS, PA, 1977, 15, 1, 440223). A group of railroad workers undergoing a training in the Goša factory also complained about the ineffectiveness and disorganized nature of their training in Yugoslavia (DA MSP RS, PA, 1977, 15, 1, 412646). And a number of similar examples could be reported.

64 - AJ, 142, A 012, *Visit of the personal representative of the Yugoslav President to Angola*, September, 1978.

65 - Several Yugoslav delegations visiting African countries throughout the 1960s emphasized that Yugoslavia had a high standing in those regions but that certain flaws of its policy might threaten its position. See, for example: AJ, 142, 540, *Report of a SSRNJ delegation visiting Western Africa in 1967*; AJ, 142, A 011, *Report about the visit of a SSRNJ delegation to the liberated territory of Angola, and about the talks with the representatives of African liberation Movements between August 5th and September 5th 1972*.

66 - AJ, 142, A 011, *Visit of a SSRNJ delegation to Angola*.

67 - The structure of Angolan export to Yugoslavia in the late 1970s consisted almost exclusively (around 90%) of coffee; AJ, 142, A 012, *Information regarding the visit of the personal representative of the Yugoslav President to Angola*, September, 1978.

68 - AJ, Federal Executive Council (803), 694, *Platform for the Third meeting of the Mixed committee for economic and scientific-technological cooperation*, Belgrade, 9 April 1980.

69 - Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969-1976, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, 108. *Memorandum 1*, Washington, June 11, 1975.

70 - AJ, 837, I-3-a/3-5, *Visit of the Angolan Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento*, 11-16 May 1976.

71 - *Ibid.*

72 - This view was expressed both in internal assessments and during the meetings with the Angolan representatives. See: AJ, 837, I-3-a/3-6, *Tito's speech during the visit of Agostinho Neto*, 1977; KPR, I-3-a/3-6, *Information of recent developments in Soviet-Angolan relations and proposals for our further action*, 15 March 1977.

73 - AJ, 837, I-3-a/3-6, *Information on domestic and foreign policy of PR Angola and its relations with Yugoslavia*, 1977. The Cuban rhetoric was similar. Yugoslav diplomats assessed at the Preparatory conference in Belgrade for the Summit Conference in Havana that the Cuban delegation only rarely mentioned non-alignment and kept emphasizing the anti-colonial and anti-imperial nature of the NAM instead (Jakovina 2010: 112).

74 - AJ, 837, I-5-b/3-5, *Vidoje Žarković's visit to Angola*, October 1978.

75 - AJ, 837, I-5-b/3-5, *Notes on conversation between Vidoje Žarković and Agostinho Neto*, 8 October 1978.

76 - AJ, 837, I-5-b/3-5, *Angola, The visit of the personal representative of the Yugoslav President to Angola*. Furthermore, Yugoslav sources offer many evidence about Soviet pressures on Angola regarding their cooperation with Yugoslavia. For example, the Soviets protested about Neto's visit to Yugoslavia in 1969, or even pushed him not to attend the NAM Summit Conference in Lusaka (see: AJ 142, I 553). After gaining independence, Lucio Lara told the Yugoslavs that the MPLA had witnessed various pressures on part of their "friends" to cease cooperation with Yugoslavia (See: AJ, 507, IX, 3/I-1-46-95, *Note about a conversation between Branko Mikulić and Lucio Lara*, 15 December 1976).

77 - AJ, 507, IX, 3/I-1-46-95, *Report about the visit of the LCY delegation to Angola for the 20th anniversary of the MPLA*.

78 - DA MSP RS, PA, 1977, 14, 24, 440900, 21 July 1977.

79 - DA MSP RS, PA, 1977, 15, 1, 412646, *Ministry of Transport sends the original letter of three Angolan workers attending a course at the Goša factory*, 1 March 1977.

- 80 - AJ, 837, I-3-a/3-5, *The visit of the Angolan Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento*, 11-16 May 1976.  
 81 - AJ, 837, I-5-b/3-5, *Notes on conversation between Vidoje Žarković and Agostinho Neto*, 8 October 1978.  
 82 - AJ, 837, I-5-b/3-5, *Visit of Vidoje Žarković to Angola*, 9. X 78 - 30. XI 1979.

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